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NO LONGER IN JEOPARDY: THE IMPACT OF
HUDSON v. UNITED STATES ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF CIVIL
MONETARY PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF
THE SECURITIES LAWS UNDER THE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Robin W. Sardegna"
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 10, 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that it
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause1 to criminally prosecute
people for violations of banking laws and regulations after imposing
civil monetary penalties on them for the same violations.2 With this
decision, the Court strongly disapproved and, in effect, overruled the
analysis employed in United States v. Halper,3 a seminal double jeopardy
case decided just eight years earlier. 4 Following the Court's decision in
Hudson, the General Counsel to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement publicly
took the position that, although they had shied away from doing so in
the past, they now had a "green light" to seek civil monetary penalties
that were also the subject of criminal investigations or prosecutions. 5 As
a result, whether Hudson should apply in the realm of securities law as
well as banking law becomes a question of great importance. With
regard to sanctions imposed under the Securities Enforcement Remedies
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 [Remedies Act], 6 the Second Circuit
* The author received his J.D. from the State University of New York at Buffalo and an
LL.M. "with distinction" from the Georgetown University Law Center. He is currently a
staff attorney at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement, in
Washington, D.C.
- The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility
for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
of the author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
I The Double Jeopardy Clause reads as follows: "[Nior shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
3 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
4 See Richard M. Cooper, Separate Civil and Criminal Penalties Are Now OK, 4 NO. 12 Bus.
Crimes Bull.: Compliance & Litig. 1 (1988).
5Paul Beckett, SEC May Seek Civil Fines in Some Cases Involving ParallelCriminal Prosecution,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8,1998, at B6.
6The Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429,104 Stat. 931 (1990).
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has held that the Hudson analysis applies to securities law as well as and
7
banking law.
Hudson, like Halper before it, represents a major sea change in
double jeopardy law with respect to civil monetary penalties. To
understand which case represents the more faithful approach to double
jeopardy jurisprudence, Part HI examines the purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the interests it protects, and its jurisprudence. Parts III,
IV, and V review the Halper, Hudson, and Palmisanocases. Part VI will
discuss the ramifications of Hudson and Palmisano for sanctions imposed
under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 [ITSA] and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 [ITSFEA] and will
answer the three following questions: 1) whether Hudson was correctly
decided 2) whether the Second Circuit was correct to apply Hudson to
Remedies Act sanctions, and 3) what, if any, implications Hudson and the
Second Circuit's decision 8 have on civil monetary sanctions imposed
under the 1TSA 9 and the ITSFEA. 10 Part VII addresses alternative bases
for contesting the imposition of both civil and criminal sanctions for the
same violations of the securities laws.
II.

THE

PURPOSE, HISTORY, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE DOUBLE

JEOPARDY CLAUSE

A.

The Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Interests It Protects

The general function of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to assure that
the prosecution and punishment of an individual have the degrees of
finality and fairness essential to the administration of an efficacious
justice system. The principle of fairness ensures that the defendant
receives a punishment, which is set by the court, authorized by the
legislature, and is commensurate with his criminal liability. The
guarantee of finality ensures that a criminal defendant once convicted or
acquitted, need not live in a state of anxiety of further prosecution for the
same offense." Put in other words, the state should not be able to harass
a defendant through multiple criminal prosecutions for the same
offense, 12 thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal,
and enhance the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty because the government gets an opportunity to perfect its case
against him. 13 The government should not be able to impose a second
See SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860 (2nd Cir. 1998).
sId.
9Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
"oPub. L. No. 100-704,102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
7
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punishment, because it is dissatisfied with a sanction obtained in the first
14
proceeding.
In all criminal matters,15 the Double Jeopardy Clause protects
against three abuses: A second prosecution for the same offense
following an acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense
16
following a conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense.
Moreover, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the defendant not only
from the conviction and punishment, but also from anxieties and risks
17
accompanying the prosecution.
The first two prohibitions against subsequent prosecutions for the
same offense preserve the defendant's interest in the finality of the
verdict.18 The finality of the verdict is at the heart of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 19 It operates in a manner similar to the civil procedure
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 20
Historically, the prohibition against multiple punishments served as
a protection against unfairness in sentencing.21 More specifically, the
multiple punishments prohibition protected against the imposition of

I

See Note, A Definition of Punishmentfor Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's MultiplePunishment Prohibition,90 YALE L. J. 632, 634 (1981).
12 See Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double Jeopardy Implications: A Thorn by any Other
Name Would Prickas Deep, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1235,1299 (1995).
13 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); Rebecca Frank Dallet, Comment,
Taking the Ammunition Away from the 'War on Drugs': A Double Jeopardy Bar to 21 U.S.C. 881
after Austin v. United States, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235,242 (1993).
14 See Dallet, supra note 13, at 261 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451, n.10
(1989)).
15While

the terms of the clause explicitly prohibit only a second jeopardy of "life or limb,"
suggesting that its protections apply only to the most severe forms of punishment, the
Supreme Court rejected such a narrow reading of the clause and held that it applies to all
criminal offenses. See Note, supra note 11, at 641 (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163 (1874)); Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and
Prohibited Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause - United States v.
Halper, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989), 65 WASH. L. REv. 437,439-40 (1990).
16 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717 (1969). See also, Eric Michael Anielak, Note: Double Jeopardy: ProtectionsAgainst
Multiple Prosecutions,61 Mo. L. REV. 169, 171 (1996) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711,717 (1969)).
17 See Jonathan A. Blumberg, Comment, Implications of the 1984 Insider Trading Sanction Act:
Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy,64 N.C. L. REV. 117, 143 (1985).
1 See, e.g., Dallet, supranote 13, at 241-42; Elizabeth Jahncke, Note, United States v. Halper,
Punitive Civil Fines, and the Double jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
116 (1991).
19See, e.g., Dallet, supranote 13, at 241-42.
20 Jahncke, supranote 18, at 116.
21 See, e.g., Dallet, supranote 13, at 242.
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two separate penalties for an offense when the legislature has authorized
only one punishment. It also prevented the imposition of one penalty
more severe than what the legislature intended. 2 As one might suspect,
multiple punishment issues arise when the government imposes two
punishments in either a single prosecution or successive prosecutions.23
B. History and Jurisprudenceof the Double Jeopardy Clause
1.

The Protection Against Multiple Punishments

The multiple punishments prohibition has its origins in the 1874
case of Ex Parte Lange.24 Lange was convicted of stealing mailbags, an
offense punishable by either one year in prison or a $200 fine. 25 The trial
judge, however, mistakenly sentenced Lange to one year in prison and a
$200 fine. 26 After Lange paid his fine, the judge realized his error,
vacated the sentence, and resentenced Lange to one year in prison only. 27
The Supreme Court reversed Lange's second sentence, reasoning that
imposition of the sentence punished him twice. 28 Writing for the Court,
Justice Miller stated that the trial judge had no power to impose a prison
sentence on Lange when he had already fully satisfied one of the
maximum alternative penalties prescribed by the legislature. 29 The
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause "was designed as much to
prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as
being twice tried for it." 3° After Lange the multiple punishments
prohibition was consistently explained as a right of defendants not to be
punished to any greater degree than that authorized by the legislature,
31
until Halper.
2.

The Protection Against Successive Prosecutions

The application of the successive prosecutions arm of the Double
Jeopardy Clause traditionally has focused on whether the second
"prosecution" is one that punishes criminally for the same offense. 32 In
theory, civil sanctions do not punish criminally. 33 The government,
however, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause when it seeks to impose,
in addition to a criminal sanction, a second criminally punitive sanction
in the guise of a civil proceeding. 34 Whether a sanction is truly civil and
what factors are used to make this determination, therefore, is the
22Jahncke, supra note 18, at 117 (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163; Missouri v.

Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81).
23 Dallet, supra note 13 at 242 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49(1989)).
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continually vital inquiry.35 In deciding if a criminal sanction is
masquerading as a civil proceeding, the Court has consistently stated
that the analysis is one of statutory construction, and the Court has
historically given a substantial amount of deference to legislative
intent. 6
2485

U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).

25Id. at 175.
6 Id.

27 Id.

281d.
29
Ex Parte Lang, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,175 (1874).
30/d. at 173.
31 Peter

Michael Bryce, Note, Second Thoughts on Punishments: Redefining the Multiple
Punishments Prohibition,50 VAND. L. REV. 167, 168 (1997)(citing Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S.
376 (1989); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980)).
3 See, e.g., Dallet, supra note 13, at 245.
3 Anielak, supra note 16, at 171.
3 Id. at 172 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989); United States v.
$485,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994); Gainer v. United States, 904 F. Supp.
1234 (D. Kan. 1995); Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.Cal. 1994)).
3Id.

See, e.g., Jahncke supra note 18, at 122. This was not always the case. In fact, prior to
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), there was a lack of consistency in the Supreme
Court's analyses of double jeopardy successive prosecution cases. See infra note 37 and
accompanying text. See Linda S. Eads, SeparatingCrimefrom Punishment: The Constitutional
Implications of United States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 929, 934-35 (1990). The Court
seemed at times willing to apply double jeopardy protections to civil penalty proceedings.
See Id. In United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603 (1881), for example, the Court held that
where a criminal defendant entered into a plea agreement with the United States for
removing liquor from a warehouse without paying the liquor tax, the government could
not subsequently assess a double tax penalty on him because its purpose was to punish
rather than to raise revenue. Moreover, in United States v. LaFranca,282 U.S. 568 (1931), the
Court stated that a double tax imposed for selling liquor in violation of the prohibition law
following a criminal conviction for violating prohibition laws could run afoul of double
jeopardy if it were punishment. But see Waterloo Distilling Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S.
577 (1931) (holding that an in rem forfeiture action seeking a distillery following a
conviction of unlawfully using alcohol for beverage purposes without paying the tax for so
using it was not barred by the conviction since the action was against the property itself
rather than the wrongdoer, i.e., it was not punishment). Similarly, in Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436 (1886), the Court held that an acquittal on a criminal charge of defrauding the
United States by virtue of not paying a liquor tax and for selling liquor without charging
the tax barred a subsequent civil forfeiture action by the United States because the action
amounted to punishment. But see Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 8 S. Ct. 846, 31 L.
Ed. 743 (1888) (holding that a civil forfeiture action was not barred by a criminal
conviction); Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897) (holding that acquittal on a criminal
charge of unlawfully removing timber from federal land did not bar a subsequent civil
forfeiture grounds on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds, recasting Coffey as a res
judicata/collateralestoppel case). See Id. (citing Clark, Civil and Criminal penalties and
Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976)). The
standards for such analyses, however, were unstated and undeveloped, as the cases appear
3
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a)

Mitchell, Hess, and Rex TrailerCo.: The Origin of a Statutory
Construction Analysis

Beginning with the 1938 case of Helvering v. Mitchell,37 the Court
developed a statutory construction analysis, which granted considerable
deference to Congress, to address successive prosecution issues. In
38
Mitchell, the respondent had been tried and acquitted of tax fraud.
After the conviction, the Court assessed a deficiency of over $700,000 to
Mitchell in unpaid taxes. 39 In addition, Mitchell was assessed a further
deficiency of over $350,000 under section 293(b) of the Revenue Act of
1928,40 which provided that "[i]f any part of any deficiency is due to
fraud with intent to evade tax, then 50 per centum of the total amount of
the deficiency (in addition to such deficiency) shall be so assessed,
collected, and paid." 41 Mitchell claimed the assessment violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 42 The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court held that, unless the additional deficiency was so
punitive as to render the proceeding essentially criminal in nature, the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply. 43 The court relied on statutory
construction to determine if the additional deficiency was criminal in
nature. 44 The Court then defined two types of remedial sanctions that
would not qualify as criminal in nature. 45 The first of these was the
revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted. 46 The second was
to have been decided on an ad hoc basis. See Id. (citing Levin, OSHA and the Sixth
Amendment: When is a "Civil" Penalty Criminal in Effect?, 5 HASTINGS CoNST. L. Q. 1013
(1978). At the same time, the Court also expressed a willingness to engage in statutory
construction on occasion. For example, in Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926), the
Court examined the legislative intent behind a statutory provision authorizing actions in
equity for violations of the National Prohibition Act, 41 Stat. 305, 314 (1919), and concluded
that its intent was to prevent future violations rather than to punish previous ones.
Therefore, the Court found that double jeopardy did not prevent a court from imposing an
injunction following a criminal acquittal of violating the statute.
37 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
38 Id. at 395.
39Id.
40 Pub. L. No. 70-562, 45 Stat. 791, 858.
41Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 395.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 398-99.
4Id. at 399 (citing Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926) (holding that an injunction
against occupying certain premises used in the manufacture of liquor, in violation of the
prohibition law, for a year or, in the alternative, posting a bond, following an acquittal for
maintaining a public nuisance based on the manufacture of the liquor was not punishment
and, therefore, was not barred by the former acquittal)).
45Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
4 Id.
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forfeiture of goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable
sums of money. 47 Although the Court noted their comparative severity,
it said these sanctions had been upheld against the claims that they were
criminal in nature and, therefore, were subject to the rules of procedure
governing civil cases. 48
The Court found the imposition of an additional tax to be remedial,
because it operated primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the
revenue and to reimburse the government for the investigation expense
and loss resulting from the taxpayers' fraud. 49 Moreover, the fact that
the statute provided for the collection of the 50% addition to be executed
either "by distraint" or "by a proceeding in court" 50 proved to the Court
that Congress intended the sanction to be civil in nature. 51 From this, the
Court concluded that civil enforcement of a remedial sanction barred
52
any double jeopardy claim.
47 Id.

48Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400 (citing Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1935);
Various Items v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931) (holding that an in rein forfeiture action

is not a criminal proceeding, since it brought against the property rather than the
wrongdoer); Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S.
37 (1914) (holding that a suit to recover a fixed penalty for unlawfully importing laborers
into the United States was a civil action necessitating only proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, despite the fact that the statute referred to the violation as a misdemeanor); Grant
Brothers Construction Company v. United States, 232 U.S. 647 (1914) (holding that a suit to
recover a fixed penalty for unlawfully importing laborers into the United States was a civil
action, authorizing the reading of depositions of absent witnesses, despite the fact that the
statute referred to the violation as a misdemeanor); Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911) (holding that an action to obtain a monetary
penalty for operating trains without automatic couplers was a civil action); Hepner v.
United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (holding that a proceeding to obtain a monetary penalty
for unlawfully bringing an alien into the United States was not criminal in nature); Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (holding that an action to collect a
monetary penalty for bringing an alien with a loathsome disease into the United States was
not a criminal proceeding and, therefore, the right to trial by jury did not apply); United
States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, (1896) (holding that confrontation clause did not apply to an
in rem forfeiture action, since the proceeding was not criminal in nature); Passavant v.
United States, 148 U.S. 214 (1893)).
49Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401 (citing Passavant v United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221 (1893);
Dorsheimer v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 166 (1868); Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 114 (1865); Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853); Taylor v. United States, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 197 (1845)).
so26 U.S.C. §§ 276, 293 (1994).
51Mitchell,303 U.S. at 401- 02.
52 Id. at 402-404 (citing Murphy, 272 U.S. at 630; Various Items, 282 U.S. at 577). To support
his conclusion, Justice Brandies relied on the fact that the Revenue Act of 1928 contained
two separate and distinct provisions for sanctions which appeared in different parts of the
statute. Id. at 404. This, Brandeis claimed, made the character of the sanction at issue clear.
Id. The sanction at issue was titled "Additions to the Tax" and was in a portion of the
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The Court's analysis in Mitchell gave almost complete deference to
the label affixed to the statute by Congress.53 Thus, while a civil action in
the form of a tax could, in theory, be considered a second prosecution in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Mitchell Court made such a
possibility remote by its high degree of deference to Congress.54
Subsequent to Mitchell, this statutory construction approach became the
standard used to resolve issues of applying double jeopardy successive
prosecution protection to civil monetary penalties.5
In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,56 the Court reaffirmed its
statutory construction test.57 In Hess, local government units employed
the respondents, a group of electrical contractors. 58 A substantial part of
the respondents pay, however, came from the federal government. 59 A
grand jury indicted the respondents for defrauding the United States,
and the respondents plead no contest. 60 Subsequently, the petitioner
sued the contractors, under 18 U.S.C. § 3490.61 This statute authorized
any person to bring suit on behalf of the government in a qui tam action,
and any recovery obtained was to be evenly split between the plaintiff
and the government. 62 Plaintiff obtained a judgment for $315,000.

statute entitled "Interest and Additions to the Tax." Id. at 405. The other sanction came
under the heading "Penalties" and provided fine and imprisonment for willful attempts to
evade the tax. Id. at 404-05. It was obvious, Justice Brandies stated, that Congress intended
for the 50% addition to be a civil sanction. Id. For Justice Brandies and the Court, that,
coupled with its remedial nature, was sufficient to defeat the double jeopardy claim.
5 See Dallet, supra note 13, at 245.
54See Anielak, supra note 16, at 172.
5 See, e.g., Eads, supra note 36, at 936, 938. Mitchell introduced three propositions to double
jeopardy analysis of civil proceedings: 1) to resolve the issue simply by construing the
relevant statute, 2) to refuse to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to any civil penalty
where the underlying statute is remedial (read civil) in nature, and 3) that a civil statute
does not lose its civil nature by having a purpose other than merely compensating the
government for a monetary loss. This last proposition is so because the Mitchell Court
recognized that the statute at issue had an additional purpose of safeguarding the revenue
generally in addition to compensating the government for its loss as a result of the
taxpayer's fraud. See id. at 937-38. This third proposition was to be vastly expounded upon
in subsequent cases.
6 317 U.S. 537 (1942).
57 See Jahncke, supra note 18, at 123.
5 Hess, 317 U.S. at 539.
5Id.

Id. at 385.
The precursor to the False Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1994). Section 3490
provided for a penalty of $2,000 plus double the damages sustained by the government.
62 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3491, 3493 (1994).
6

61
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$203,000 of the award was for double damages, and $112,000 was an
aggregate of the $2,000 sums for each violation. 63
The Court used the statutory construction analysis from Mitchell to
determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3490 imposed a criminal sanction." The
Court pointed out that the statutes on which the suit rested provided for
distinct civil and criminal remedies, and the civil remedy did no more
than "afford the government complete indemnity for the injuries done
it."65

The Court went on to state that "[i]t is, of course, well settled that for
one act a person may be liable both to pay damages and to suffer a
criminal penalty."66 The Court then compared the government to a
private party who had been defrauded. Because Congress had the
power to give an individual a right to sue for damages when the
individual had been defrauded, Congress could also allow the
government to sue for recovery from the fraud, irrespective of any
67
criminal penalty also imposed on the wrongdoer.
Even though the statute authorized a recovery of more than actual
damages, the Court concluded that did not render the civil remedy
criminal in nature. 68 The Court reasoned that the provision was not
criminal, because the government still did not receive more than its
actual damages, in light of the qui tam provision. 69 The Court
hypothesized that even treble damages, as in anti-trust actions, 70 might
survive a double jeopardy claim because parties could collect punitive
damages in private civil suits, permissible even in conjunction with
criminal punishment?' The Court reasoned that law could provide the
same measure of damages for the. government as it could for a private
person. 72 According to Justice Black, people were commonly punished

6 Hess, 317 U.S. at 540.
6Id. at 549.

65Id. (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401).
6 Hess, 317 U.S. at 549.
6 Id.
6 Id. at 550.
6

9Id.

70 At the time, only private anti-trust actions were authorized. Government anti-trust suits
for damages were not authorized until 1955, and government anti-trust suits seeking treble
damages were not authorized until 1990. See Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L.

No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2879.
71Hess, 317 U.S. at 550-51. In fact, in dicta, Justice Black surmised that even quadruple
damages would not constitute criminal punishment. Id. at 551.
72Id.
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through civil proceedings.73 Although the Court recognized that the
respondent was being punished in a certain sense by the statute, the
punishment was not so severe that it would convert the statute from a
civil one to a criminal one. 74 The Court stated that the chief purpose of
the statute was to provide the government with restitution.75 Moreover,
allowing double damages plus a sum certain only ensured that the
government would be made whole while amid the inherent difficulty in
determining the proper sum that would provide full restitution. 76
In 1956, the Court next addressed the double jeopardy successive
prosecutions issue in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States.7 Rex Trailer had
been convicted of five counts of violating the Surplus Property Act of
1944.78 Following the conviction, the government brought a civil suit
under Section 26(b) of the Act. Under this Act, three remedies existed: 1)
$2,000 per acquisition plus double the damages sustained by the
government, 2) twice the consideration paid for the property, as
liquidated damages, or 3) the government could keep the consideration
paid, as liquidated damages.79 The government claimed $2,000 each for
five violations, under Section 26(b)(1), and moved for summary
judgment, based upon the conviction.80 The district court granted the
motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Faced with Rex Trailer's claim that the imposition of the monetary
sanction would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court stated that
the only issue was whether Section 26(b)(1) was civil or criminal.81 The
Court held the recovery authorized by the statute was civil in nature. 82
The Court reasoned that the government could resort to the same
remedies to protect its property rights available to a private party. 83

3

Id. at 550.

74Id. at 551.

7 Id.
76

Id.

7 350 U.S. 148 (1956).

Pub. L. No. 78-456, 58 Stat. 765 (1944). That statute gave veterans a preference in
obtaining war surplus property. Rex Trailer Company was convicted of fraudulently
obtaining war surplus property. Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 149, 150
(1956).
78

79Id.

at 148-49.

o Id.
81Id. at 150,
82Id. at 151.
8

151 (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399).

Id. (citing Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850).
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Moreover, liquidated damages provisions were commonplace and, when
reasonable, not to be regarded as penaltiess 4
The Court reviewed the legislative history, which recognized the
alternative remedies as civil in nature. Moreover, section 26(d) referred
to each of the three remedies as civil and provided that they "shall be in
addition to all other criminal penalties and civil remedies provided by
law."85 Noting that this statute was essentially identical to the statute in
Hess, the Court relied on its construction of the statute in Hess.86 Based
upon these factors, the Court concluded that the statute provided a civil
remedy.8 7
In Mitchell, Hess, and Rex Trailer Co., the Court engaged in statutory
construction and granted a considerable amount of deference to
Congress.
Yet the Court failed to articulate a specific test for
determining when a civil sanction for restitution becomes so punitive
that it is really a criminal fine.88 The trend in these cases suggests that
the government is entitled to "rough remedial justice," meaning that it
may demand compensation according to imprecise formulas, such as
reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages,
without being deemed to have attempted to impose a second criminal
punishment. 89
b)

One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States:
The Court Builds on its Foundation By Considering
Government Investigative and Prosecution Expenses

In 1972, the successive prosecutions issue came before the Court
again in the form of a forfeiture statute. In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones
Trailer Co, Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 149,151 (1956).
85Id. at 151-52.
86Id. at 152.
87 Rex Trailer Co., Inc., 350 U.S. at 154. The Court rejected Rex Trailer's argument that the
failure of the government to allege specific damages rendered this recovery impermissible.
Id. at 152-53. No requirement existed, the Court said, that specific damages be shown,
because the recovery was in the nature of liquidated damages. Id. It was obvious, the
Court said, that the government had been injured through Rex Trailer's fraudulent
purchase of war surplus trucks because it decreased the numbers available to government
agencies and for sale to veterans. Id. at 153. Since such damages were difficult to ascertain,
however, the Court said, liquidated damages were appropriate. Id. at 153-54. The Court
found that the recovery fixed by Congress was not "so unreasonable or excessive that it
transformed what was clearly intended to be a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Id. at
84Rex

154.
8 See Anielak, supra note 16, at 173.

89See id. (citing Halper,490 U.S. at 446).
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and One Ring v. United States,9° the defendant was acquitted on charges of
smuggling certain articles into the United States without declaring
them.9 1 Following the acquittal, the government brought an in rem civil
forfeiture action against the articles in district court. 92 The owner
93
intervened and argued that his acquittal barred the forfeiture action.
The Supreme Court again disagreed.
The Court held that there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause because the case involved neither two criminal trials nor two
criminal punishments. 94 Congress could, the Court said, impose both
criminal and civil sanctions for the same conduct. 95 It could not,
96
however, impose or attempt to impose two criminal punishments.
After determining that the question of whether a given sanction is civil
or criminal is one of statutory construction, 97 the Court construed the
forfeiture statute to find that Congress intended it as a civil remedy.
Both the criminal and civil forfeiture provisions at issue were part of the
Tariff Act of 1930.98 According to the Court, the forfeiture provision
appeared in Title IV, Part III, of the Act.99 Title IV was entitled
"Administrative Provisions," and Part III was called "Ascertainment,
Collection, and Recovery of Duties."1°° On the other hand, the Court
noted that the criminal provision with which Klementova had been
charged was part of the "Enforcement Provisions" of the Act and became
part of the U.S. Criminal Code. 10 1 The Court stated that where the
sanctions were separate and distinct and were contained in different
parts of the U.S. Code, it was clear that Congress intended and did create
a civil and a criminal remedy.10 2 The forfeiture provisions were intended
to aid in enforcement, provided reasonable liquidated damages for
violations of the inspection provisions, and served to reimburse the
government for costs of inspection, investigation, and enforcement

9o409 U.S. 232 (1972).
9Id. at 233.
92d.

931d.

94Id. at 235.
95Id. at 235-36.

Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,235-36 (1972).
at 237 (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 397).
9 Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, 729.
9Id.
100
Id.
96One
97Id.

101

Id.

102 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236-37 (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 404).
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expenditures. 1°3 Thus the Court concluded that these provisions were
remedial sanctions. 1°4
c)

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez: The Court Develops a Test
for Determining the Effect of Nominally Civil Statutes

Outside the context of Double Jeopardy analysis, the Court
interpreted a statute that divested Americans of their citizenship. 105 In
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,10 6 several people whose citizenship had
been revoked claimed a violation of due process. Accordingly, the Court
had to determine whether the statute was criminal or civil. In
determining that the statute imposed criminal punishment without due
process of law, the Court developed and utilized a seven factor test.
Those factors were:
(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether
the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6)
whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable to it; and (7)
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned. 10 7
Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent, these seven factors
must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.108
Subsequently, the Court applied the Mendoza-Martinez test in a
number of contexts to determine whether various measures were
criminal or civil, punitive or remedial. 109 Most noteworthy, however,
was the Court's use of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors to develop a
specific test to determine whether a civil sanction was punitive enough
13 Id. at 237.
104 Id. Moreover,

the Court said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress, i.e.
forfeiture of the undeclared articles, was not "so unreasonable or excessive that it
transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty." Id. at 237
(citing Rex TrailerCo., 350 U.S. at 154).
105Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
106Id.
07

Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168, 169.

'us
Id. at 169.

I'll See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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to constitute in a criminal penalty. Seventeen years after instituting the
seven-factor test in Mendoza-Martinez, the Court developed a two-part
test to determine the difference between a civil and criminal penalty in
United States v. Ward.110
d)

Ward: The Synthesis of the Statutory Construction and the
Mendoza-Martinez Analyses

At the time Ward was decided, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act [FWPCA]II required any person in charge of a vessel or onshore or
offshore facility was required to report the discharge of oil or other
hazardous substances into navigable waters to the appropriate agency of
the United States Government.11 2 Failure to supply such notification was
criminally punishable.13 The statute also specified that notification
could not be used in any criminal case against the violator.11 4 In addition
to criminal penalties for violations, at the time, the FWPCA also
provided for civil monetary penalties of up to $5,000 for unlawful
discharges." 5
After providing the required notice of a discharge pursuant to the
statute, and based upon his notice, the Coast Guard assessed Ward a
$500 civil monetary penalty. 116 Ward claimed the civil penalty was
actually a criminal punishment and, therefore, the reporting requirement
violated his right against self-incrimination. 117
The Supreme Court concluded that the question of whether the
statute was criminal or civil was a matter of statutory construction.118 In
the two-part analysis the Court utilized, it first must determine whether
Congress indicated, either expressly or impliedly, a preference for one
label or the other. 119 Second, where Congress has indicated an intention
to establish a civil penalty, the Court had to determine whether the
statutory scheme was so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate that
110448 U.S. 242 (1980).
1 33 USC §1321 (now referred to as the Clean Water Act).
112

Ward, 448 U.S. at 244.

113

Id.

114Id.
115 Id. at 245; FWPCA, § 311(b)(6).
The statute was amended in 1978 to increase the
penalties to a maximum of $250,000. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576,92 Stat. 2168.

Ward, 448 U.S. at 246-47. The district court subsequently reduced the penalty to $250. Id.
at 247.
116

117

Id.

118Id.

at 248 (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237).

119Id. (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 236-37).
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intention. 120 With regard to the second inquiry, the Court employed the
seven-factor Mendoza-Martinez test, mandating that "only the clearest
proof" would suffice to turn what Congress intended as a civil sanction
121
into a criminal punishment.
Employing the two-part test, the Court determined that Congress
had intended to create a civil penalty by virtue of it being labeled a "civil
penalty" in the statute and its being set apart from the criminal
provisions. 122 Employing the Mendoza-Martinez test for the second part,
the Court found that only one factor favored Ward. The behavior to
which the penalty applied was already a crime. 123 The Court, however,
recognized that Congress could impose both criminal and civil sanctions
with respect to the same conduct.124o In effect, Ward added a second step
to the statutory construction test first employed in Mitchell.1 25
e)

One Assortment of 89 Firearms: Application of the Ward
Analysis to Double Jeopardy Claims

Although the Ward analysis has implications for a number of
different areas, 126 it has special significance in the double jeopardy arena.
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,27 a criminal defendant
28
was acquitted of knowingly dealing in firearms without a license."
Following the acquittal, the government brought an in rem civil forfeiture
action against the weapons. 129 Mulcahey, the owner, interceded and
claimed the action was barred by his acquittal.
A unanimous Court employed the Ward analysis and found that
Congress intended the forfeiture to be a remedial civil sanction. 130
Because the action was in rem, a historically civil action, and because
Congress provided for a summary administrative forfeiture proceeding
for items under $2,500, the Court felt that Congress had clearly intended
a civil sanction. 3 1 Additionally, the Court relied on the fact that the
120 Id. at 248-49 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-621 (1960) (holding that

terminating social security benefits is not criminal punishment)).
121Id. at 249 (citing Nestor, 363 U.S. at 617).
12 Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
2 Id.
at 250.
124Id. (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 235).
125
See Dallet, supra note 13, at 246; Anielak, supra note 16, at 173.
126See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
127
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
12 Id. at 356.
129 Id.

130Id.at 363.
131 Id.
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scope of the forfeiture provision was broader than that of the criminal
provision. 132 The Court also noted Congress' attempts to curb the
widespread traffic in firearms. The forfeiture provision furthered
Congress' "remedial aims of 'controlling the indiscriminate flow' of
firearms and to 'assist States and local communities to adopt stricter gun
control laws. '" 133 In addition, the forfeiture provision discouraged
unregulated commerce in firearms and removed from circulation those
firearms that had been used or were intended to be used outside
regulated channels of commerce. 34 The court declared that keeping
firearms out of the hands of unlicensed dealers was plainly more of a
remedial goal than a punitive one. 13 5
With regard to the second portion of the Ward analysis, the Court
found that only one of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors were in
Mulcahey's favor: the actions giving rise to the forfeitures could also be
the subject of criminal penalties. 136 This factor lost its strength when
viewed in the context that Congress may impose both civil and criminal
sanctions for the same behavior. 137 That factor alone was not enough to
turn the forfeiture proceeding into a criminal penalty. 138 In addition,
because the forfeiture provision applied to a broader range of conduct, it
was not actually coextensive with the criminal provision. 139
These successive-prosecution or punishment-prong cases held that a
civil sanction would not trigger a double jeopardy prohibition unless it
was actually criminal in nature. 140 Thus, a finding of punishment was
not the critical factor. Criminal punishment only resulted from a statute
that was criminal in nature. 141 Civil punishment did not constitute
punishment or prosecution for double-jeopardy purposes. 142 Moreover,
the multiple punishment prong of double jeopardy should only protect
defendants against criminal punishment in excess of that authorized by
the legislature. 143 Thus, at the time Halper was decided, the legislative
132
Id. at 363-64.
133

United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984).

134Id.

135
Id.
136
Id.

at 365.
Id. at 365-66 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 250; Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399).
138Id. at 366. In deciding that a prior acquittal on criminal charges did not foreclose a
forfeiture action based on the same conduct, the Court explicitly overruled Coffey v. United
States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886). Id.
139
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984).
140See Jahncke, supra note 18, at 128.
141See Eads, supra note 36, at 940.
4
12 See id.
'43 See supra note 31 and accompanying text; Hall, supra notel5, at 940.
3
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branch enjoyed a substantial amount of deference from both arms of
double-jeopardy analysis.
III.

UNITED STATES V. HALPER

A. Analysis of United States v. Halper
Irwin Halper worked as a manager in a medical laboratory
providing services for eligible Medicare patients. 144 As an employee, he
submitted sixty-five false claims for reimbursement to Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Greater New York, an intermediary for Medicare.4s
Halper claimed reimbursement for each claim in the amount of $12, nine
dollars more than the $3 authorized reimbursement. 146 Accordingly,
Blue Cross overpaid the lab $585, which it passed along to the federal
47
government.1
In April 1985, a grand jury indicted Halper on sixty-five counts of
criminal false claims. Halper was convicted on all counts and sentenced
to two years in prison and a $5,000 fine.1 " The government then brought
a civil false claims action against Halper in district court under the civil
False Claims Act.149 At the time, this statute authorized a civil penalty of
$2,000, double the amount of damages that the government sustained
because of the false claim and costs of the civil action.15° Having violated
the False Claims Act sixty-five times, Halper could be penalized more
than $130,000.151
A unanimous Court pointed out that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protected against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the
same offense following a conviction, a second prosecution for the same
offense following an acquittal, and multiple punishments for the same
offense.15 2 The Court said that the third abuse was at issue.153 The Court
14 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,437 (1989).
145Id.
146Id.
147Id.
148Id.

149Id. at 438.
150United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 438 (1989). Since the time of Halper's conduct,
section 3729 was amended as part of the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153, to increase the penalty to "not less than $5,000 and not more than
$10,000 plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the
act of that person," and "the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or
damages."
151Halper,490 U.S. at 438.
152Id. at 440 (citing North Carolinav. Pearce,395 U.S. 711,717 (1969)).
153Id.
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framed the issue as whether the penalty authorized by the False Claims
Act, under which Halper was subject to liability of $130,000 for false
claims amounting to $585 constituted punishment.1' 4 The Court
distinguished Mitchell, Hess, Rex Trailer Co. and Ward, because they failed
to address questions arising when a remedial penalty does not remotely
approximate the government's actual costs and damages.'Finding the double jeopardy protection to be "intrinsically
personal," 1s6 the Court rejected a general examination of the nature of
the proceeding. Instead, the Court assessed the character of the
sanctions actually imposed on the individual.157 The labels "civil" and
"criminal" were "not of paramount importance" the Court said, because
civil and criminal proceedings and penalties may advance punitive as
well as remedial goals. 158 The Court instead chose to examine the
penalty imposed and to assess the purposes that the penalty might
serve.15 9 In this context, a civil penalty could also enforce a minimal
punishment when it served not only a remedial purpose, but also
promoted retribution and deterrence, the goals behind criminal
punishments. 160 Thus, when a civil sanction could not fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather could only be explained as
also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, it was
punishment. 61 The Court held that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
a person who has received punishment in a criminal prosecution may
not be subjected to an additional civil sanction if the civil sanction can
not be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution.1 62
According to the Court, this rule applied to the "rare case" when a
fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific, but small-gauge, offender to a
163
sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he caused.
Therefore, when a person has previously been subjected to a criminal
penalty, and a subsequent civil penalty "bears no rational relation to the
goal of compensating the government for its loss but rather appears to
qualify as punishment in the plain meaning of the word," then the
154Id. at 441.
155Id. at 441-446.
156Id. at 447 (citing Hess, 317 U.S. at 554 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
1s7
Halper, 490 U.S.
158Id.
159Id.at 448.

at 447.

160
Id.
161Id. (citing Mendoze-Martinez, 372
162Halper,490 U.S. at 441.
163Id. at 449.
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defendant is entitled to an accounting of the government's damages and
164
costs to determine if the penalty sought is in fact a second punishment.
Finally, the Court emphasized that the government could still seek
the full civil penalty, no matter what its purposes or effects are, against a
person who has not previously been punished.165 The Court also
allowed the government to seek the full civil penalty, if it were sought in
conjunction with a criminal sanction in the same proceeding, provided
the total aggregate punishment did not exceed the maximum amount
authorized by the legislature. 66
B. Outside Criticism of the Court's Analysis in Halper
This "rare case" exception spurred a considerable amount of
controversy. Some commentators lauded the case 167 because the Ward
test was too deferential to the legislative branch 168 and invited
prosecutorial abuse.1 69 Others hailed Halper as a major doctrinal
breakthrough, because the court ignored the distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings and applied the Double Jeopardy Clause as a
protection of a defendant from either civil or criminal double
punishment.1 70
The vast majority of the commentary, however, was negative.
Opponents of the decision suggested that Halper ignored a consistent line
of cases that recognized double jeopardy protection only in criminal
cases.ln In fact Halper marked the first time that double jeopardy
164Id.
165 Id. at 450.
166Id. (citing

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 368, 369 (1983)). Presumably, this last statement
is a reference to the fact that any restitutionary sanction imposed pursuant to the criminal
conviction must be credited toward the remedial civil penalty. Were it not, there could be a
double assessment of a remedial sanction, and the aggregate amount the defendant would
be obligated to pay might exceed the maximum amount of monetary penalties authorized.
There is authority for this position. See, e.g., Palmisano,135 F. 3d at 863, 864.
167See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 1267 ("In sum, Halper's insight that double jeopardy
protection should extend to civil proceedings which punish is sound.").
10 Id. at 1247. See also Eads, supranote 36, at 966-67.
169See, e.g., Janeice T. Martin, Note, FinalJeopardy: Merging the Civil and Criminal Rounds in
the Punishment Game, 46 FLA. L. REv. 661 (1994).

See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L. J.1325 (July, 1991).
171 See, Eads, supra note 36, at 929. According to Eads, the Halper Court's efforts to
distinguish the prior cases were unconvincing. Id. at 948. Halper distinguished Mitchell on
the basis that Mitchell had been acquitted whereas Halperhad been convicted of a crime. Id.
Eads said this was irrelevant because Mitchell's acquittal was unimportant to the Mitchell
Court. Id. at 949. Mitchell, she said, was premised on the fact that the sanction in that case
'7
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protections applied to a civil sanction. 172 Departing from precedent, the
Court rejected any reliance on the civil or criminal labels. 173 Instead, the
Court focused on whether the sanction's effect constituted
punishment. 174 Halper was also criticized for, for the first time,
interpreting the Double Jeopardy clause to serve as only a partial bar to a
sanction 175
Critics also suggested that the Court misapplied the multiplepunishment aspect of double jeopardy. Prior to Halper, the prohibition
against multiple punishments ensured only that multiple punishments
could not be imposed for a single criminal offense, unless the legislature
provided otherwise. Thus, the prohibition against multiple punishments
was determined to be a civil one and that double jeopardy protection applied only to
criminal punishments. Id. Halperdistinguished Hess and Rex Trailer Co. on the ground that
the sanctions there "were not exponentially greater than the amount of the fraud." Id.
Eads said this was misleading because those cases had, in actuality not developed any
severity test. Id. at 950. Those cases, she said, recognized that a statute may provide more
than actual damages to the government and still not lose its quality as a civil action. Id.
Eads discussed how Justice Black had said in Hess that treble or quadruple damages would
have been acceptable as substitutes for punitive damages. Id. See also Peter J. Henning,
Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 1 (1993). Henning made the same criticisms of Halper's treatment of
precedent. Id. at 49-50. He also pointed out how Mitchell had construed the same statute
that was at issue in Halper and concluded it provided a civil remedy and how the Halper
Court had rejected the Ward analysis. Id. See also Martin, supra note 169, at 671 (discussing
Halper's rejection of the Ward test); Jahncke, supra note 18, at 133-34 (discussing Halper's
failure to engage in any statutory construction, as the prior cases had done); Cox, supra note
12, at 1245 (arguing that Halper rendered the Ward/Mendoza-Martinez analysis largely
irrelevant).
172See, e.g., Hall, supra note 15, at 437; Michael Waldman, "Damage Control": A Defendant's
Approach to the Damage Penalty Provisionsof the Civil False Claims Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L. J. 131,
146 (1992); Henning, supra note 171, at 44.
17 See, e.g., Anielak, supra note 16, at 174; Bryce, supra note 31, at 178 (problem).
174See Eads, supra note 36, at 955. Eads argued that the Court obscured and removed the
bright line distinction between civil and criminal penalties and replaced it with "a
complicated philosophical inquiry into what constitutes punishment." See also, Hall, supra
note 15, at 444 (whether a penalty is civil or criminal is no longer dispositive as the Court
will, following Halper, look to the effect of the sanction); Robert S. Pasley, Double Jeopardy
and Civil Monetary Penalties, 114 BANKiNG L. J. 4, 10-11 (1997) (The Halper Court made it
clear that one should look to the primary purpose behind the statute as applied to
determine whether it should be held to be remedial or punitive); Bryce, supra note 31, at 178
(under Halper, one must focus on the nature of the sanction rather than the nature of the
proceedings as a general matter).
175 Eads, supra note 36, at 952.
According to Eads, under Halper, the government was
precluded only from recovering the amount that exceeded rough remedial justice and
constituted punishment, and it could retain any amount "on the remedy side of the line."
Id. Eads also pointed out the unworkability of the Halper approach to forfeitures. Id.at 952,
n. 86. Could a criminal defendant only have to forfeit a portion of the offending articles?
Id. How does one forfeit, for example, part of a gem?
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only limited courts and prosecutors, not legislatures. 176 Halper, however,
applied multiple-punishments protection to a civil proceeding and
determined the effect of the penalty on the individual instead of
examining whether the legislature had authorized both sanctions. 17"
Others noted that the Court mischaracterized the issue as multiple
punishments, when really it was a multiple prosecutions issue. 178
Accordingly, these commentators argued that the Court defined multiple
punishment in terms of proceedings rather than legislative maximums, 179
blurring the distinction between multiple-punishments and successiveprosecutions analyses.180 Additionally, by relying on the multiplepunishment protection, a person previously convicted of a crime would
be protected while a person previously acquitted received no double
jeopardy protection, because the person acquitted received no
punishment. 181
Commentators also criticize Halper for refusing to recognize the role
of deterrence in civil penalty schemes.18 2 It was noted that a "host of
statutory penalties [were] in jeopardy, ranging from SEC insider trading
penalties to forfeiture provisions to the civil tax fraud penalty to
penalties for protection of the environment and workplace." 1s 3 The
decision had the potential to create a cumbersome administrative burden
on government enforcement efforts,184 because it required the
government to choose between civil and criminal remedies. 1ss At the
176 Hall supra note 15, at 441.

Id. at 442; Bryce, supra note 31, at 177 (the Halper Court held that punishments imposed
in separate proceedings violated the multiple punishments prohibition even though the
legislature had clearly authorized both punishments).
17 See Hall, supranote 15, at 453; Henning, supra note 171, at 52.
17 See Bryce, supra note 31, at 168, 169
18D
See Henning, supra note 171, at 4. In part, as a result of the confusion caused by Halper,
at least one commentator has argued for the elimination of multiple punishments
prohibition in favor of a protection against the risk of multiple punishments. Cox, supra
note 12, at 1262. Others, e.g., Justice Scalia (Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 798-808 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)), have argued that no multiple
punishments prohibition actually exists at all. See, e.g., Anielak, supra note 16, at 179-84.
181See Hall, supra note 15, at 438; Jahncke, supra note 18, at 139-40.
112 See, e.g., Eads, supra note 36, at 932. Eads argues that while Halper states clearly that
deterrence is not a legitimate, nonpunitive government objective, Mitchell, Hess, and Rex
Trailer Co. all suggested that a deterrent purpose did not convert a civil remedy into a
criminal one, because deterrence had a proper role in civil law. Id. at 976. (problem) See also
Henning, supra note 171, at 51 (arguing that Halper's conclusion that a civil sanction rises to
the level of punishment if any deterrent or retributive purpose is present is unnecessarily
restrictive in its interpretation of legitimate goals of civil remedies).
183
Eads, supranote 36, at 977.
18 See, e.g.; at 929; Henning, supranote 171, at 45.
185See Hall, supra note 15, at 445; Eads, supra note 36, at 932; Henning, supra note 171, at 45.
See also Philip S. Khinda, Undesired Results Under Halperand Grady: Double Jeopardy Bars on
177
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very least, a much greater degree of coordination between the Justice
Department and the administrative agencies, as well as between the civil
and criminal divisions of the United State Attorney's offices would be
necessary.186 Prosecutors would need to consider double jeopardy
implications whenever parallel civil and criminal proceedings were
contemplated.1 s7 The SEC would have been particularly vulnerable to
double-jeopardy claims because of its practice to seek monetary penalties
in insider-trading cases.1sa If deterrence could no longer be a valid
nonpunitive government objective, then a number of civil penalty
statutes, including the Insider Trading Sanction Act, were in jeopardy.18 9
The Halper analysis also necessitated a great deal of judicial activism
at the trial level, because trial judges would have to sort through the
purpose and effects of each sanction imposed on a case-by-case basis. 19°
In this regard, the Court provided little guidance for determining when a
sanction became disproportionate enough to the harm suffered by the
government to become punitive. 191 Not only was it scant, but the
guidance that the Court did proffer was criticized as being confusing.192
Criminal RICO Actions Against Civilly-Sanctioned Defendants, 25 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs.
117, 139-40 (1991).
186See Cheh, supra note 170, at 1380. See also Cox, supra note 12, at 1237-38, 1299. One
alternative, authorized in Halper, 490 U.S. at 452, was to seek the full bore of both civil and

criminal penalties in a single proceeding. This, however, would present extremely difficult
procedure issues, such as differing burdens of proof, discovery rules, and constitutional
safeguards, would all have to be worked out. See Bryce, supra note 31, at 181. Many
believe these issues make such joinder impossible. See Id. (citing Nancy J.King, Portioning
Punishment: ConstitutionalLimits on Successive and Excessive Penalties,144 U. PA. L. REv. 101,
142 n.123 (1995)).
187 See Hall, supra note 15, at 438.
188 See Cheh, supra note 170, at 1380. Because of Halper, the practice by the SEC of seeking
civil monetary penalties in cases where a criminal prosecution had occurred or was
contemplated was severely reduced, until Hudson. See infra Section IV.
189
See Eads, supra note 36, at 977. See also, Jahncke, supra note 18, at 114; Cox, supra note 12,
at 1238.
190See Eads, supra note 36, at 932; Henning, supra note 176, at 53, 55 (arguing that the caseby-case method engenders uncertainty in an area of the law that works best with bright
line rules).
191See, e.g., Hall, supranote 15, at 448.
192 Eads, supra note 36, at 973, 974; Pasley, supra note 174, at 10-11.
Both of these articles
point out how the Court said that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve
a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment," Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, implying that the sanction
must be solely remedial in nature, and that the Court held that under the Double Jeopardy
Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be
subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution," Id. at 448-49,
implying that the sanction may be acceptable so long as it is not solely punitive.
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Finally, the approach that the Court chose in Halper undermined
Congress' supposedly unilateral power to determine whether or not to
193
adopt parallel civil and criminal mechanisms to enforce the law.
C. Author's Criticismof the Court's Analysis in Halper
The analysis and holding in Halper resulted from the Court's
obvious displeasure with the government's use of a civil remedy to
extract an additional penalty from the defendant and from the Court's
struggle to reach a just result for one individual without adequately
considering the effect its decision would have. 194 The Court had three
options. First, it could have followed precedent and determined whether
the False Claims Act was penal or civil. This option would not have
allowed the Court to find for Halper, because the Court had already held
the same Act to be civil in nature in Hess. Second, it could have
overruled Hess and held the False Claims Act to be a criminal statute.
Third, it could have cast the issue differently and analyzed it from a
multiple-punishment standpoint. It chose the third option as the least
distasteful of the alternatives. 195
The government made the correct argument in Halper.196 The Court
did not adequately recognize the proper roles of deterrence and
retribution in civil law. For example, in actions between private parties,
courts award punitive damages to deter and punish, yet no one argues
that this makes a civil action for damages a criminal proceeding or a
punitive damages award a criminal punishment. Moreover, a New York
federal district court has held that the mere fact that the state is a plaintiff
in an action seeking punitive damages does not render the remedy
criminal.1 97 The mere fact that the state also has the power to seek a
criminal sanction as well as a civil one does not render a civil remedy
otherwise.

Hall, supra note 15, at 445; Henning, supra note 171, at 55. See also Bryce, supra note
31, at 169 (arguing that the time-honored notion that the multiple punishment prohibition
guarantees that defendants will suffer no punishment further than that allowed by the
legislature, which involved legislative deference, was in conflict with Halper's notion of
multiple punishments, which focused on the proceedings instead of the legislative
maximums, and undermined the authority of the legislature to prescribe punishments)
(problem).
19 See Henning, supranote 171, at 45, 49.
115See Eads, supra note 36, at 946-47.
116See Halper,490 U.S. at 441.
'9 United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 748 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
193See
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Halper is a prime example of the adage that "bad facts make bad
law." Faced with a clear injustice, the Court seized on a footnote 98 and
dicta 99 to right that injustice, at a price of confusing double-jeopardy
jurisprudence and jeopardizing legitimate government enforcement
activities. The Court should have either allowed the injustice to stand for
the sake of preserving the clarity of double jeopardy law or decided the
case on some alternative basis. 20°
D. Post-Halper Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Initial Expansion and
Subsequent Contractionof the Halper Analysis
Undeterred by the criticism, the Supreme Court extended the Halper
analysis to the realm of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.
In Austin v. United States,201 the Court held that the Excessive Fines
Clause applied to the forfeiture of the defendant's mobile home and auto
body shop after an in rem civil forfeiture action that followed conviction
of state drug charges, because the forfeiture constituted "punishment." 20 2
Following Austin, however, the Court began to have second
thoughts. In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,2°3 the
Court held that a tax "on the possession and storage of dangerous
drugs," 20 4 in the amount of the greater of a specified amount per drug 2 s
or 10% of the market value of the drug, payable after arrest on drug
charges, was punitive where the State attempted to collect nearly
$900,000 in tax, after imposing a criminal penalty and settling a forfeiture
action for $18,000. Because the tax was punitive, the Court held that it
violated the Double-Jeopardy Clause. In so doing, however, the Court
refused to apply Halper's method for determining whether the sanction

198Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979) ("Retribution and deterrence are not
legitimate non-punitive governmental objectives.").
199
Rex Trailer Co., 305 U.S. at 154; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237 ("[Ilt cannot be
said that the measure of recovery fixed by Congress... is so unreasonable or excessive that
it transforms what was dearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.').
2w For example, the Court could have decided the case on due process or Eighth
Amendment grounds.
201509 U.S. 602 (1993).

2 The Court found that forfeitures constituted "payment" and, therefore, could be
considered as fines. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
2W511 U.S. 767 (1994).
20
4MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-25-111, repealed by 1995 MONT. LAWS § 74 ch. 18, § 4 ch. 446.
20 E.g., $100 per ounce for marijuana. MONT. CODE ANN. Section 15-25-111(2), repealed by
1995 Mont. Laws § 74 ch. 18, § 4 ch. 446.
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was remedial or punitive. 2°6 The Court did not consider whether the
sanction did more than make the government whole. Moreover, in
United States v. Ursery,2° 7 the Court foreshadowed a major shift by
applying the two-part Ward analysis in lieu of the Halper analysis to find
that in rem civil forfeiture proceedings are not criminal proceedings for
20 8
double jeopardy purposes.
E. The Effect of Halper on Lower Courts and the SEC
Despite the apparent opening for claimants that Halper appeared to
create, only two lower courts found statutory penalties violative of
double jeopardy in reported cases. 2°9 On the other hand, many more
courts found that civil penalties did not constitute punishment for

206 Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 783. The Court found it to be inappropriate to the analysis of tax

statutes. This is most likely the case because the purpose of tax statutes is to raise revenue
rather than to make the government whole for an injury done to it.
518 U.S. 267 (1996).

The Court cited 89 Firearms as its authority for employing the Ward test in a double
jeopardy case. Id. at 2142.
2 In Hall, 730 F. Supp. 646 (M. D. Pa. 1990), the court found a penalty of $1,035,000
assessed, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(2), for failing to declare an equal amount of bonds
on a customs declarations form upon entering the United States, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§
5316(b), 5322(b), to constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The failure by the
government to make any attempt at quantifying its losses, coupled with the large amount
of the penalty compared to the government's apparent damages, which were minimal,
brought the case squarely within the realm of Halper, the court said. Hall, 730 F. Supp. at
655. In Quinones-Ruiz v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 983 (S. D. Cal. 1994), the court applied
Halper and Austin to a civil forfeiture of $40,420, which the claimant had failed to declare
upon entering the United States, under 31 U.S.C. § 5317(c). The court held that, since civil
forfeiture was punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes, under Austin, 509 U.S. 602
(1993), which had employed a Halper analysis, it was punishment for double jeopardy
purposes as well. Quinones-Ruiz, 864 F. Supp. at 983.
Additionally, in an unreported case, United States v. Morse, 1997 WL 181043 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), the Southern District of New York held that a $100,000 penalty imposed on three
violators, pursuant to the Remedies Act, was a punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
The court examined the legislative history of the Act, as well as the three tiered sanction
structure, and determined that the purpose and nature of the Act were deterrent and,
therefore, punitive, in nature. Morse, 1997 WL 181043 at *3. The court also found the
sanction not to be reasonably related to government expenses because, while the
government alleged approximately $100,000 in investigative costs, it sought to impose that
amount on each of the three respondents. Id. at *4.
A number of other lower courts had also ruled against the government on double
jeopardy claims following Halper,but they were overruled, vacated, or modified by higher
courts. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled
sub nom. Ursery v. United States, 511 U.S. 767 (1996); S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 96 F. 3d 906 (1996), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 623 (1997); Gainer v.
United States, 904 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Kan. 1995), rev'd, 89 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1996 ).
2w
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double jeopardy purposes. 210
The case law of the lower courts
demonstrated that the lower courts were generally unwilling to find
211
penalties so severe as to amount to punishment.

210In Karpa v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 909 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1990), the court ruled
that a 25% penalty on overdue taxes was not punishment because it was not
disproportionate to damages caused to the government by taxpayers who do not pay their
taxes in a timely fashion. In Bernstein v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1990), the court
ruled that an assessment of approximately $52,000 under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law
(CMPL), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a, for 210 false items submitted to Medicare, totalling $3,150,
was not punishment for double jeopardy purposes, in large part because the statutory
maximum penalty was much greater. The CMPL authorizes the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to assess a penalty of up to $2,000 plus twice the amount claimed for each
false item submitted to Medicare. In U.S. v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1990), the court
found a $30,000 penalty for supplying false statements to, and violating other regulations
of, HUD was in the nature of reimbursement for damages caused by Bizzell to the
government and was not overwhelmingly disproportionate to those damages.
Accordingly, the court held that the assessment was not punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. Bizzell, 921 F.2d at 264-65. In United States v. Walker, 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991),
the court found a civil penalty of $500 imposed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1459 for failing to
declare approximately one gram of marijuana on a customs declaration form was not
punishment for double jeopardy purposes, in light of government expenses associated with
maintaining and administering customs checkpoints.
Similarly, in United States v.
McClinton, 98 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1996), the court upheld penalties of $500 and $1,000 for
similar violations as not constituting punishment for double jeopardy purposes. In United
States v. Barnette, 10 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816 (1994), the court
held that treble damages imposed under the Civil RICO statute (18 U.S.C. § 1964), where
the United States is the plaintiff, did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes, because a recovery of three to one did not approach the shocking 222 to one ratio
in Halper. In United States v. United States Fishing Vessel Maylin, 725 F. Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla.
1989), the court found the forfeiture of a fishing vessel for fishing and game violations,
pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 3374(a)(2), to bear a rational relation to compensating the
government for investigative expenses and the damage to wildlife. Therefore, the
forfeiture was held not to be punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Maylin, 725 F.
Supp. at 1222.
Interestingly, after Halper, several courts also found monetary penalties assessed
under the False Claims Act not to be punishment. In the form of the Act as it existed at the
time of Halper, the Southern District of New York upheld penalties assessed for three
claims. See supra text accompanying note 154. United States v. Pani, 717 F. Supp. 1013
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). Three claims, the court said, did not give rise to the "rare case"
contemplated by Halper. Pani, 717 F. Supp. at 1019. In the Act's subsequent form, i.e.,
$5,000 to $10,000 plus treble damages for each violation (See, note 154), the Eighth Circuit
ruled that an assessment totalling over $480,000 for four false claims was not punishment
for double jeopardy purposes. United States v. Peters, 110 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
Denied, 118 S.Ct. 162 (1997). The court held that the treble monetary penalty was "in the
nature of rough remedial justice," Peters, 110 F. 3d at 617 (citing United States v. Brekke, 97
F. 3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1996), and that the $5,000 per violation was not punitive in light of
the small number of violations. 110 F. 3d at 617, 618. In United States v. Fliegler, 756 F.
Supp. 688 (E. D. N.Y. 1990), the court found a penalty of $115,000 not to constitute
punishment where the government's costs were in excess of $110,000. In United States v.
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Halper also had a considerable effect on the SEC's enforcement
program. In a number of securities fraud cases where the respondents
had already been subject to criminal penalties, the SEC did not seek civil
monetary penalties, for fear of a double jeopardy claim. 212 The
government recognized the Halper Court's admonishment that the
government could still obtain both civil and criminal penalties as long as
the proceedings were not successive. 213 Thus, the SEC continued to seek
monetary penalties in cases where parallel proceedings occurred
simultaneously. 214 Additionally, the SEC also responded to the threat
Halper presented by demanding a waiver of any double jeopardy claim

in all settlement offers. 215

Boutte, 907 F. Supp. 239 (E. D. Tex. 1995), the court found a penalty equal to 3.38 times the
amount of damages to the government was not punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Several post-Halpercases addressed the double jeopardy issue presented by sanctions
imposed under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), a statute very similar in subject
matter to the securities laws. After 1974, the Act provided for civil monetary penalties in
the amount of $100,000 per violation for commodities fraud or manipulation, as well as a
trading bar and/or a suspension or revocation of registration. 7 U.S.C. § 9; Pub. L. No. 93463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (this provision has since been amended as part of the Futures
Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590. See infra notes 420-22 and
accompanying text). In In the Matter of Incomco, Inc., and Philip M. Smith, 1991 WL 281626
(C.F.T.C. 1991), the CFTC ruled that the imposition of a trading ban was a remedial
prophylactic sanction to which double jeopardy did not apply. Incomco, 1991 WL 281626,
*11 (C.F.T.C.). The CFTC went on to find that a civil monetary penalty of $5,000 bore a
rational relationship to the remedial goal of the proceeding, deterring similar violations in
the future. Id. at 12. In United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1992), employing a
Halper analysis, the court found that a trading bar and a $75,000 civil monetary penalty did
not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The court found the penalty to
be remedial when compared with government costs. Furlett,974 F. 2d at 843-44. In light of
Furlett's "pernicious, widespread, and institutionalized" fraud, the court found the trading
bar a valid remedial measure to ensure the integrity of the market and to protect it from
him. Id. at 844.
211 Nelson T. Abbott, United States v. Halper: Making Double Jeopardy Available in Civil
Actions, 6 BYU J. Pub. L. 551,568 (1992).
212 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Langheinrich, SEC Litigation Release No. 13924, SEC Docket, Vol. 55,
No. 17, at 2341 (Jan. 7, 1994); S.E.C. v. Lloyd Securities, SEC Litigation Release No. 13841,
SEC Docket, Vol. 55, No. 5, at 713 (Oct. 21, 1993). See also Arthur B. Labby & W. Hardy
Callcott, Patternsof SEC Enforcement under the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Monetary Penalties,58
ALB. L. REv. 5,35 (1994).
213Halper,490 U.S. at 450.
214See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Arnold, SEC Litigation Release No. 13356, SEC Docket, Vol. 52, No. 6,
at 1327 (Aug. 31, 1992); S.E.C. v. Cohen, SEC Litigation Release No. 13800, SEC Docket, Vol.
55, No. 2, at 301 (Sept. 24, 1993); S.E.C. v. Weiss, SEC Litigation Release No. 13811, SEC
Docket, Vol. 55, No. 2, at 306 (Sept. 29, 1993). See also Labby & Callcott, supra note 212, at
35. Apparently, the SEC hoped that separate proceedings occurring simultaneously would
not be considered as successive proceedings.
215 See Richard J. Morvillo, Caught in a Double Bind: In a Cunning Dodge Around the
Constitution, the Government Voids the Guarantees of Protection Against Double Jeopardy for
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HUDSON V. UNITED STATES

A. Analysis of Hudson
Hudson was the chairman and controlling shareholder of two failed
banks. 216 Rackley presided over one bank and held office on the board of
directors of the other; and Baresel was a board member of both banks. 217
An examination of the two banks led the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) to conclude that Hudson, Rackley, and Baresel had
used the banks to arrange a series of loans to third parties which violated
banking statutes. In reality, the banks had loaned money to Hudson so
that he could redeem bank stock that he had pledged as collateral on
218
defaulted loans.
On February 13, 1989, the OCC issued a "Notice of Assessment of
Civil Monetary Penalty" which alleged that the three men had violated
banking laws by causing their banks to unlawfully allow Hudson to
receive the benefit of the loans. The notice also alleged that the illegal
loans resulted in nearly $900,000 in losses to the banks and contributed
to their failures. The notice did not allege any harm to the government.
Based upon the allegations, the OCC assessed penalties of $100,000
against Hudson and $50,000 each against Rackley and Baresel. The
notice also informed all three that the OCC intended to bar them from
further participation in the conduct of "any insured depository
219
institution. ,
In October 1989, Hudson, Rackley, and Baresel resolved the OCC
proceedings by entering into a "Stipulation and Consent Order" wherein
Hudson, Baresel, and Rackley agreed to pay $16,500, $15,000, and
Defendants in Cases that Involve the SEC, NATL. L. J., June 3, 1991, at 13 (1). The language
chosen by the SEC, however, does not unambiguously reflect an intention to waive
constitutional defenses. Id. The language the SEC requires is as follows: "[The settlement]
does not resolve, extend to, affect, or preclude any other proceeding which may be brought
against [the respondent]." Id. It could be argued that this language is not sufficiently clear
to compel the conclusion that a defendant waived his or her double jeopardy protections.
Id. Waivers of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear. Id.
(citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)). While some courts have ruled that this
language precludes a defendant from making a double jeopardy claim, in the author's
opinion, they are not correct. See infra note 343 and accompanying text. The C.F.T.C.
routinely requires such a waiver as well. See, e.g., In the Matter of William Koerner, IV
Great
River Corp., 1998 WL 27558, *2 (C.F.T.C.).
21
6Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 491-92 (1997).
217 Id. at 492.
218 Id.
219 Id.
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$12,500, respectively. Additionally, each agreed not to "participate in
any manner" in the affairs of any banking institution without written
authorization from the OCC and all other relevant regulatory agencies.
The consent orders also contained language providing that the orders
did not constitute "a waiver of any right, power, or authority of any
other representatives of the United States, or agencies thereof, to bring
other actions deemed appropriate." 220
In August 1992, all three were indicted in the federal district court in
Oklahoma for conspiracy, misapplication of bank funds, and making
false entries in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 656, and 1005.221 The
grounds of the indictments were the same transactions that formed the
basis for the prior administrative actions. 22 The three men moved to
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. m The district court
denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed on the
nonparticipation sanction issue but vacated and remanded on the
monetary sanctions issue. 224 On remand, the district court granted the
motion to dismiss the indictments.m The government appealed, and the
2 7
court of appeals reversed. 226 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed the reversal of the appellate court. 22 8
The Supreme Court again noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 229 The Court
applied the Ward test to determine whether this statute indicated that the
particular punishment was criminal or civil.m First, the Court needed to
determine whether the legislature indicated, either expressly or
impliedly, a preference for a civil label or a criminal one. 231 Second,
where the legislature indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty,
the Court needed to determine whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive in purpose or effect that it transformed an intended civil
penalty into a criminal one. 232 To make this second determination, the
2o id.
221 Id.

MHudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,492 (1997).
W Id.
224Id.
M Id.
226 Id.
n7 Id. at 493.
22

Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488,493 (1997).
n9 Id. (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975);
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
m Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 493. (citing Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399).
231Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493. (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248).
232Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493. (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; Rex TrailerCo., 350 U.S. at 154).
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Court used the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezm as
"guideposts."234 These seven factors had to be considered in relation to
the statute on its face.2m In employing the second part of the two-part
test, "'only the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative intent
and transform what has been demonstrated a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty."2
Applying this test, the Court held that the criminal prosecutions of
Hudson, Baresel, and Rackley did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Congress had intended the OCC monetary penalties and
debarment sanctions to be civil in nature.u 7 The statutes authorizing the
imposition of the monetary penalties expressly provided that such
penalties are civil in nature.2 Moreover, the Court noted that the fact
that the authority to issue sanctions was conferred to an administrative
agency was further evidence that Congress intended to provide for a
civil sanction.23 9
Turning to the second prong of the Ward test, the Court found "little
evidence, much less than the clearest proof [required]," suggesting that
neither the OCC monetary penalties nor the debarment was so punitive
as to render them criminal, despite Congress' intent to the contrary. 240 In
the context of the second factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test, the Court
stated that neither monetary penalties nor debarment have historically
been viewed as punishment. 241 Revocation of a privilege voluntarily
granted, such as a debarment, "is characteristically free of the punitive
criminal element." 242 Similarly, the Court said, "the payment of fixed or
variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized as
enforceable by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of
1789."243
Addressing the first factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test, the Court
noted that the sanctions imposed did not involve an affirmative
372 U.S. 144 (1963).
2m Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493.
2m5Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169). See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

m Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 493. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249)
495.
- 12 U.S.C. §§ 93 (b)(1), 504 (a) (1994).
2" Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495. (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,402; United States v.
dissenting); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
U.S. 228, 235 (1896)).
237Id.at

240 Id.
241

Id.

242Id.

at 495-96 (quoting Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399 n.2).
S.Ct. at 496 (quoting Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400).

243Hudson, 118
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disability or restraint, because they did not approach imprisonment. 244
Also, neither sanction in this case was imposed upon a finding of
scienter. 245 The statutes in question allowed for the assessment of
penalties irrespective of the violator's state of mind. 246 That the amount
of the penalty assessed under the statutes in question was affected by the
good faith of Hudson and his associates was unimportant to the Court;
the analysis of the nature of the statutory scheme was conducted "on its
face." 247 Similarly, under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(c)(ii), one could be
debarred for willful disregard for the safety of an institution.
Willfulness, however, was not a necessary condition for debarment. 248
The disregard for safety of institution needs only to be continuing.249
Therefore, the Court maintained that scienter was not an issue.
Furthermore, while the Court recognized that the conduct deserving
the OCC sanctions was also criminal, this was insufficient to render the
sanctions criminally punitive. 25° Although, the Court recognized that
deterrence is a traditional goal of criminal punishment, the Court held
that the presence of a deterrent purpose was insufficient to render a
sanction criminal. Deterrence "may serve civil as well as criminal
goals." 251 The Court did not address the sixth and seventh factor of the
Mendoza-Martinez test.252
Thus, criminal prosecutions in the wake of the civil penalties did not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. More importantly, the Court
strongly disapproved and, in effect, overruled the analysis employed in
Halper. The Court noted that the Halper analysis deviated from the
Court's traditional double jeopardy doctrine in two ways: first, it
bypassed the threshold question of whether or not the successive
punishment at issue was a criminal punishment; second, it assessed the
character of the actual sanctions imposed rather than evaluating the
statute on its face to determine whether it provided for what amounted
to a criminal sanction.2 By focusing solely on whether the sanction was
so grossly disproportionate to the harm as to constitute punishment, the
seventh factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test had been elevated to
2" Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (citing Nestor, 363 U.S. at 617).
245Hudson, 118

St. Ct. at 496.
246
Id.
247
Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169).
248
Hudson,118 S. Ct. at 496.
249 Id.
250Id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993)).
21 Id. (quoting Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 488,496).
m See Cooper, supra note 4, at 3.
253
Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 494.
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dispositive status. When no one factor of that test was meant to be
controlling. 2-4
The Court characterized the Halper analysis as unworkable, because
all civil penalties have some deterrent effect.2 If a sanction must be
solely remedial or completely nondeterrent to avoid implicating the
Double Jeopardy Clause, then no civil penalty is beyond the scope of the
Clause.2s6 Accordingly, a double jeopardy analysis determination would
be necessary in every case where a civil penalty is sought. 257 Further,
such a determination could not be made before a sum certain is
obtained. 25 Finally, the Court pointed out that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment adequately provided enough protection against the evils
that occurred in Halper.259
B. Comments on Hudson
The Court's criticisms of the Halper analysis in Hudson are justified.
The Halper decision was a major departure from double jeopardy
precedent, 260 and Hudson represents a return to the traditional double
jeopardy analyses of successive prosecutions and deference to the
legislature. Unlike the Halper analysis, the Hudson approach is both
reliable and efficient. 261
The Court correctly employed the Ward analysis. First, Congress
clearly intended for 12 U.S.C. §§ 93(b), 262 504(a), 263 the statutory
provisions under which the monetary penalties were assessed, to be civil
remedies. The drafters refer to the titles of Section 93 and Section 504 as
the "Civil Monetary Penalty" and "Civil Penalty." Both sections 93 and
504 authorize the penalties under those statutes to be assessed by an
2u Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169).
2m Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 494-95 (citing Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 776-77 n.14; Ursery, 116 S. Ct.

at 2145 n.2).
25 Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495.
2 Id.
259 Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).
2
w Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 494.

Eads, supra note 36, at 967. It is not, however, without its drawbacks. See infra note
268.
26 See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Title I, § 103,
Pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3641 (1978).
263 See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Title I, § 103,
Pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3641 (1978).
261See
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administrative agency rather than by judicial determination.
legislative history echoes the statutory language. 264

147
The

Second, employing the Mendoza-Martinez factors, it is clear that
Sections 93(b) and 504(a) are not so punitive in effect as to render them
criminal statutes. (1) The civil monetary penalties assessed do not
constitute affirmative disabilities or restraints. (2) The case law suggests
that civil monetary penalties historically do not constitute punishment.
(3) The imposition of these penalties does not require scienter. 265 The
factors considered under Section 504(b), including the violator's good
faith, are relevant only to determining the amount of the penalty not its
imposition. (4) Clearly the imposition of monetary penalties under these
provisions furthered the goal of deterrence and retribution. In fact, the
legislative history makes clear that Congress intended these sanctions to
promote deterrence. 266 Because deterrence is an appropriate effect of
civil sanctions, deterrence does not dispositively make the statute
criminal. 267 (5) In this case, the Court imposed monetary penalties for
criminal behavior, a factor operating in favor of finding a criminal
sanction. 268 This factor is also not dispositive, however, because
Congress has the latitude to proscribe both criminal and civil sanctions
for the same conduct. 269 (6) The banking penalties are remedial.
Sanctions imposed under Sections 93(b) and 504(a) account for the
financial resources of the bank or person charged, 270 indicating a
remedial purpose. Additionally, the imposition of civil monetary fines
extended to a far broader range of conduct than the criminal penalties,
further indicating a remedial purpose. 271 The legislative history suggests
that the policy of authorizing monetary penalties was to give agencies
flexibility to secure compliance. 272 Finally, the statutes and regulations at
issue supported the clearly remedial purpose of the stability of the
banking industry. (7) Yet, the maximum penalties that could be imposed
264 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9289

(referring to the authorization of "civil monetary penalties." ).
0 See Cache Nat'l Bank v. Hinman, 626 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Colo.1986).
266See H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9289 ("Daily
money penalties [referring to Section 504] should serve as deterrents to violations of laws,
rules, regulations, and orders of the agencies.").
267See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149.
268 See, e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365.
2 9
6 See Ward, 448 U.S. at 250; 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 365-66.
270This requirement, in fact all factors other than the seriousness of the violation, were
eliminated from consideration of the amounts of penalties under both sections in the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183,471 (1989).
271See 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 363.
27 H.R. REP. No. 95-1383, at 17.
2

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 [1998], Art. 6

148 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
under either section may be excessive in relation to the remedial
purposes of the sections. $1,000 per day for each violation for as long as
the violation continues could be potentially result in a tremendous
penalty. Sections 504(b) and 93(b)(2), however, require the OCC to
consider the financial resources of the violator in assessing the amount of
the penalty, minimizing the chance of excessiveness. With only two of
the seven factors in Hudson's favor, the Court did not have the "clearest
proof" required to convert Congress' civil remedy into a criminal one.
The Court chose and employed the correct analysis, making Hudson a
273
sound decision.
IV. PALMISANO

The soundness of Hudson has implications on the validity of
sanctions imposed under ITSA, ITSFEA, or the Remedies Act, in the face
of a double jeopardy claim. The Second Circuit held that civil monetary

The majority opinion in Hudson, however, is not without its flaws. First, Chief Justice
Rehnquist criticized Halper for creating a regime where it would not be possible to
23

determine whether double jeopardy was violated until a judgment was obtained while the
aim of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent such an action at its inception. Hudson,
118 S. Ct. at 495. While the Court's other criticisms of Halper are apt, this one is
disingenuous. The Chief Justice's argument is correct where the amount of the penalty is
within the discretion of the administrative agency or judge imposing it. Where the amount
of the penalty is mandatory, however, the argument is not correct. In such a case, one
need not wait until a judgment is obtained to determine whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits the action. If the second action is an administrative one, a respondent
could contest the validity of the initial assessment or make a motion to dismiss the action at
its inception based upon the relief sought on the face of the initiating instrument. If the
second action is a civil action in district court, one can make a motion to dismiss based
upon the relief sought in the complaint. Finally, if the second action is a criminal
proceeding, one can move to dismiss the indictment or information.
Second, in applying the second prong of the Ward test, the Court's opinion said that
the OCC sanctions were not "so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal
despite Congress' intent to the contrary." Id. [emphasis added]. In Ward, however, the test
was disjunctive, not conjunctive: "Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
The disjunctive form was used in 89 Firearmsas well. See 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63
(quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248). If this distinction was intentional, it was unfounded in the
case law. The conjunctive form of the test would, however, be more difficult for a claimant
to meet. This appears to be an unfortunately, inadvertent error, because Hudson cited
Ursery in support of its construction of the Ward test. Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 495. Ursery, in
fact, however, employed the disjunctive form. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. at 2142. Ironically Chief
Justice Rehnquist seems to misstate a test he created himself. On the facts of Hudson,
however, the error was not dispositive. Finally, the Hudson court did not explicitly address
Halper's confusing expansion of the multiple punishment doctrine. Flaws of the opinion
aside, it is apparent that the Hudson analysis is the correct one.
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penalties imposed pursuant to the Remedies Act following a criminal
274
proceeding do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
A. Analysis of Palmisano
In Palmisano,275 a bankruptcy attorney induced over ninety people to
invest a total of approximately $7.9 million in a Ponzi scheme. 276 In July
1994, Palmisano was indicted for a variety of criminal conduct in
connection with the scheme. 277 On the same day, the SEC commenced a
civil enforcement action alleging the sale of unregistered securities, in
violation of Section 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933 and the sale
of securities through fraud and misrepresentation, in violation of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and Rule 10b-5. 278 The SEC requested disgorgement and the
imposition of a monetary penalty. 279 In September 1995, Palmisano
pleaded guilty to mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and
securities fraud. 28° He was sentenced to 188 months in prison and
281
ordered to make restitution of approximately $3.8 million.
Additionally, Palmisano forfeited $700,000.282

In the civil action, the SEC moved for summary judgment, based on
the guilty pleas. 283 The court granted the motion and ordered Palmisano
to disgorge approximately $9.2 million and ordered him to pay a
$500,000 civil penalty.2 4
Palmisano appealed, claiming the
disgorgement and monetary penalty violated the Double Jeopardy
285
Clause.
The Second Circuit rejected Palmisano's claim.
Using the
Hudson/Ward analysis, the Court held that Palmisano's claim was
274SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F. 3d 860 (2d Cir. 1998).
mId.at 864.
276 Id. at 862.
mid.
27" Id.

ZId.

Specifically, the request for monetary penalties was made under Sections 101 and 201 of
the Remedies Act, which appear as Sections 20(d) of the Securities Act, and 21(d)(3) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d), 78u(d)(3), respectively. Id. at 862-63.
2
8 Palmisano, 135 F.3d at 863.
251Id.
2 Id.
MId.
2M Id.
n Id.
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"plainly meritless." 286 Under the Ward test, the Court first found that
Congress' intent clearly favored classifying disgorgement and the
penalties at issue as civil. 287 The statutory provisions of the Remedies
Act relied on by the SEC were entitled, "[Mioney penalties in civil
actions." 288 Moreover, the drafters of the statute referred to the penalties
as "civil penalties" within the text of the statute. 289 Although the statute
failed to provide a remedy of disgorgement, the Court said that
Congress had explicitly endorsed the disgorgement remedy. 29°
Additionally, precedent suggested that the district courts had an
equitable power to impose disgorgement, 291 and that the courts had
historically considered disgorgement as a civil sanction, not a criminal
one. 292
Under the second prong of the Ward test, the court found that
neither disgorgement nor the monetary penalties authorized by the
Remedies Act were so punitive in purpose or effect as to override
Congress' intent to provide for a civil remedy. 293 The court conceded
that the sanctions could not be imposed without a finding of scienter,
that the sanctions applied to conduct that was criminal as well as civil,
294
and that the sanctions possessed a deterrent character.
On the other hand, the court noted that historically disgorgement
and monetary penalties were civil sanctions, neither imposing an
affirmative
disability
nor
an
imprisonment-like
restraint. 295
Additionally, the sanctions had remedial, non-punitive purposes.
Disgorgement, the Court said, is akin to the forfeitures upheld in Ursery,
because it ensured that the wrongdoer did not profit from his illegal
acts. 296 Deterring securities fraud also served the remedial goals of
2A6SEC

v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860,864 (2d Cir. 1998).
2Id. at 865.
28 Id.
m Id.
29 Id.

Palmisano, 135 F.3d at 865-66 (citing SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v.
Manor
Nursing Ctrs., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972)).
29
Palmisano,135 F.3d at 866 (citing SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1978)). In this, the Court was undoubtedly correct. There is a great deal of caselaw holding
that disgorgement is a remedial, non-punitive remedy. See, e.g., United States v. Teyibo,
877 F. Supp. 846, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1994); SEC v.
Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Shapiro, 404 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
m Palmisano,135 F.3d at 866.
2% Id.
29 Id. (citing Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496).
2, Palmisano,135 F.3d at 866.
21
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encouraging investor confidence, increasing the efficiency of markets,
and promoting the stability of the securities industry. 297 The court
reasoned that monetary penalties imposed under the Remedies Act
furthered these remedial goals. 298
According to the court, the statute's three-tiered system of monetary
penalties minimized the possibility of a penalty being excessive in
relation to the statute's remedial goals by linking the size of the penalty
to the level of the violator's scienter, the risk of loss to others, and the
amount of the violator's wrongful profits. 299 Thus, the court held it had
"little indication," much less the "clearest proof," to find either
disgorgement or the penalties provided under the Remedies Act to be
criminal punishments.300
B. The Second CircuitProperly Decided Palmisano
The Second Circuit's decision on Palmisano appears the correct one.
Congress intended for the Remedies Act sanctions in Sections 77(t) and
78(u) to be civil in nature, given the nomenclature for the sanctions and
the legislative history of the Act. Both the House and the Senate Report
described the sanctions repeatedly as "civil money penalties." 301 The
House Report also stated that the legislation authorizes the SEC to seek
penalties in civil actions. 3°2 Both sections 77(t) and 78(u) state that the
remedies provided are not exclusive. 3°3 The government may bring
other actions authorized by law. 304 This strongly implies that Congress
intended the remedies to be distinguished from the criminal remedies
existing elsewhere. That the 1933 and 1934 Acts and the United States
Code refer to criminal penalties for the same behavior elsewhere
m Id.
298Id.

2" Id. Both Sections 20(d) of the Securities Act, and 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77t(d), 78u(d)(3), as well as 21B of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2) (dealing with
administrative proceedings), provide for a three-tiered penalty system which works as

follows: first-tier, for any violation, the greater of (i) $5,000 for any natural person or
$50,000 for any other person or (ii) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to the violator;
second-tier, for any violation with scienter, the greater of (i) $50,000 for any natural person
or $250,000 for any other person or (ii) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to the violator;
third-tier, for any violation with scienter which resulted, or could have resulted, in
substantial losses for others, the greater of (i) $100,000 for any natural person or $500,000
for any other person or (ii) the gross amount of pecuniary gain to the violator.
" Palmisano, 135 F. 3d at 866.

H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 15, 18, 22, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1382, 1385, 1389;
S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 2, 8, 9, 10, 11,.15 (1990).
" Id. at 30 [emphasis added].
3m 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(3)(C), 78u(d)(3)(C)(iii)(1994).
30'

m4 Id.
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demonstrates Congress' intent to create a civil remedy in Sections
78(t)(d) and 789(u)(d)(3). 3 5
The Remedies Act sanctions fail to be so punitive as to override
Congress' intent to create civil remedies, even though three of the seven
Mendoza-Martinez factors fell in Palnisano's favor. The House and the
Senate Report discuss the necessity for increased deterrence of securities
laws violations, and the intent to solve these violations through this new
statute. 306 Case law, however, suggests that deterrence is a legitimate
goal of civil law.3 7 Palmisano's conduct was already punishable
criminally. Congress, however, may lawfully prescribe both civil and
criminal remedies for the same conduct. 3 8 Thus, the force of two of
these three factors in Palmisano's double jeopardy claim was eviscerated.
As a further evisceration of Palmisano's claim, these sanctions fail to
impose an affirmative disability or restraint and are not generally
viewed as punishment.309 In fact, the sanctions have a remedial purpose.
The case law is replete with references to the remedial purposes of the
securities laws.310 The legislative history of the Remedies Act also
contains numerous references to the Act's remedial purpose. For
example, the House Report states that the principal purpose of [the Act]
is to provide the [SEC] with new remedial authority that will enable the
agency to operate its enforcement program in a more flexible manner.311
This enforcement program, the report says, "is necessary to maintain
investor confidence in the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of our
securities markets." 312 Because the penalties are payable directly into the
United States Treasury, as opposed to some investor protection fund or
the like, and are enforceable by the United States Attorney General, 313
they may seem more like a criminal fine. This, however, does not detract
from the remedial purposes of the Act sufficiently to recharacterize the
sanctions as criminal punishment.

0 See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 404; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 407 U.S. at 236-37; Ward, 448 U.S.
at 249.
306 H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 17, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1382, 1385, 1389; S.
REP.
No. 101-337, at 8-11 (1990).
307
See, e.g., Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149; Hudson, 118 S.Ct. at 496.
"0See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 250; 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365-66.
30 See, e.g., Hudson, 118 S.
Ct. at 496.
31o
See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
31 H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 13. See also id. at 18; S.REP. No. 101-337, at 11.
312H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 14.
313 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(3), 78u(d)(3)(C) (1994).
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The three-tiered penalty system minimizes the possibility of any
excessiveness and furthers the remedial purpose of the Act. Under the
Act, the courts have discretion to determine whether to impose a penalty
and the amount to impose. 314 Taken together, the possibility of
excessiveness of a sanction in relation to the Act's remedial goals is
minimal. The clearest proof required to override Congress' intent does
not exist, as the Second Circuit correctly noted.
C.

Additional Factors Not at Issue in Palmisano That Support the Remedial
Nature of the Remedies Act Sanctions

The third-tier
The Court did not discuss first-tier sanctions.
sanctions at issue in Palmisano and second-tier sanctions require a
showing of scienter before their imposition indicate a criminal provision.
While the third- and second-tier sanctions require a showing of scienter
and are thus indicative of a criminal provision, the scienter requirement
was the only meaningful indication of a criminal purpose or effect in the
statutory scheme and was not enough to override Congress' intent. For
the imposition of a first-tier sanction, scienter is not necessary. 315 Thus,
first-tier sanctions are clearly not subject to double jeopardy claims.
A second factor not at issue in Palmisano is that the Remedies Act
authorized ancillary relief in the form of officer/director bars in civil
actions in federal district court. 316 The court could impose this sanction
in conjunction with civil monetary penalties. 317 Such barments are
affirmative disabilities or restraints under the first factor of the MendozaMartinez test, but they fail to constitute punishment under the second
318
factor of the test.

REP. No. 101-616, at 22 (1990).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(2)(A), 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (1994). See also supranote 294.
316 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (1994); Sections 20(e) of the 1933 Act and 21(d)(2) of the
1934 Act.
317H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 22 (1990).
318See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495. Moreover, while Johnson v. S.E.C., 87 F. 3d 484 (D.C. Cir.
1996), held that a six month supervisory suspension (and, therefore, presumably, a
barment) was penal in nature for purposes of determining which statue of limitation
applied, the court specifically stated that the suspension could still be remedial and not
punishment in other contexts, such as double jeopardy. Johnson, 87 F. 3d at 256, 257.
Additionally, the SEC found, employing a Hudson analysis, that a barment from associating
with a broker-dealer or from any penny stock offering was not punishment for double
jeopardy purposes, In the Matter of William F. Lincoln, Release No. 34-39629;
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-8998, Vol. 66, No. 10, CCH SEC Docket, at 972 (Feb. 9,
1998), in part because barments had not historically been viewed as punishment. Vol. 66,
No. 10, CCH SEC Docket, at 976.
314H.R.
315
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Finally, in addition to authorizing civil monetary penalties in civil
district court actions, the Remedies Act authorizes the imposition of
monetary penalties in SEC administrative actions under the same threetiered scheme. 319 Instead of leaving the assessment and its amount
completely up to the discretion of the administrative law judge and the
SEC, as done with district court judges, 3 20 the Act prescribes six factors
321
which the SEC may consider before imposing a civil monetary penalty.
These factors help to ensure that the SEC does not convert what
Congress intended as a civil penalty into a criminal one. 322 In addition,
the fact that the sanction is imposed by an administrative agency is even
stronger evidence of Congress' intent to create a civil remedy. 323 Thus,
the Second Circuit correctly decided that the imposition of monetary
penalties under the Remedies Act does not constitute criminal
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.324 The
monetary sanctions under the Remedies Act are civil in intent and effect,
precluding the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF HUDSON AND PALMISANO FOR SANCTIONS
IMPOSED UNDER THE ITSA AND THE ITSFEA
Having discussed the implications of Hudson on the Remedies Act,
the application of the current Double Jeopardy Clause analysis to ITSA
or ITSFEA sanctions is uncertain. ITSA provides for the imposition of
civil monetary penalties of up to three times the profit gained or loss
avoided in insider trading transactions in civil actions against those who
traded and their tippers. 325 ITSFEA provides for liability of a person
controlling someone who engages in insider trading in an amount equal
to the greater of $1,000,000 or three times the profit gained or loss
avoided by the controlled person engaging in insider trading.3 26 No
court has addressed the issue of whether civil. monetary penalties
31915 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1994).
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d), 78u(d). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 22 (1990)
321 15 U.S.C. §78u-2(c)(1)-(6).
These factors include such equitable matters as unjust

enrichment and the extent of any restitution made to the victims, if any, and "such other
matters as justice may require." According to the legislative history, "such other matters"
may include the violator's ability to pay. H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 21 (1990).
2
M See H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 21 (1990).
323 See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495.
324 If the imposition of the penalties were criminal punishment, then the proceedings in
which they were sought would be criminal prosecutions for purposes of the successive
punishment analysis.
32 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, amended by,
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, § 3, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (1988). Currently this session law appears as 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1),(2).
326Id.
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assessed under either of these statutes are criminal punishments for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, under the traditional Ward
analysis revised by Hudson.
The southern district of New York has interpreted the validity of the
ITSA monetary penalties only under the Halper regime. In United States
v. Marcus Schloss & Co., 32 7 a brokerage firm settled an SEC civil
enforcement action for insider trading. 328 Pursuant to the settlement, the
firm disgorged $136,000 in illegal profits and paid double damages
amounting to $273,000.329 Subsequently, the brokerage firm was indicted
for the same conduct. 330 The brokerage firm protested, claiming a
violation of double jeopardy because the double-damages monetary
penalty constituted punishment under Halper.33 1
The district court held that the consent order that the firm entered
with SEC barred their claim, because it acknowledged the possibility of
further actions. 332 The court also ruled that the claim failed on its merits
as well.333 The court acknowledged that deterrence was a significant
goal of the ITSA, but found that Congress intended the proceedings to be
civil in nature. 3 4 The court examined the nature of the sanctions actually
imposed on the firm and concluded that the amount of the penalty
corresponded to the government's expenses of investigation and
prosecution. Thus, the penalty was not a punishment like the one
imposed in Halper.335 Moreover, the court held that the penalty was
336
"only a small part of an otherwise clearly remedial settlement[.]"
Because the court employed a Halper analysis, however, the holding no
longer has any validity.
3v 724 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

mg Id. at 1124.
29
m
Id.

330Id.
331Id. at 1125.
3m Id. at 1126-27.

The Court's position in this regard is not without support. See, e.g.,
Berstein v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1395 (10th 1990). A settlement on the civil penalties, however,
was unimportant to the Supreme Court in Halper and Hudson. Intuitively, this is the correct
view. Whether a sanction is imposed with or without consent matters not as to the
question of its being a sanction. For example, the fact that a criminal defendant enters into
a plea agreement whereby he consents to the imposition of an agreed upon punishment
does not render the sentence something other than criminal punishment.
3
mMarcus Schloss & Co., 724 F. Supp. at 1127.
- 34 Id. at 1127-28.
3
M
Id. at 1128. The notion of including the government's costs and expenses of investigation
and prosecution for determining whether a sanction was merely making the government
whole and, therefore, remedial rather than punitive had its origin in One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones, 409 U.S. at 237.

M6 Id.
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A.

Under the Ward Analysis, ITSA and ITSFEA Sanctions Are Not Criminal
in Nature
1.

ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions were intended to be civil in nature

Employing the Ward analysis ITSA and ITSFEA do not impose
criminal penalties for purposes of double jeopardy. The statutes, as well
as their legislative history, suggest that Congress intended ITSA and
ITSFEA sanctions to be civil in nature. The title of the statute, "Civil
penalties for insider trading," reference to the sanctions as "civil
penalties," 337 and Congressional designation of the civil nature of the
penalties suggest the overall intent by Congress that the courts construe
these penalties as civil in nature. 338 Additionally, section 78u-l(a)(1)(A)
& (B) authorize the SEC to "bring an action in a United States District
Court," which implies a civil proceeding 3 39
A closer look at the legislative history of these statutes also implies
the civil nature of the ITSA and ITSFEA. The House Report on ITSA
describes the penalty as a "civil money penalty"34 ° and imposes this
"civil penalty" on those who trade while in possession of material nonpublic information. 341 The House Report authorizes the SEC to seek a
"civil penalty" in district court. 342 The House Report also notes that the
purpose of the Act is to expand the scope of "civil penalties."343 Finally,
two subtitles in the House Report, "Civil Penalties for Violating Persons
and Persons 'Controlling' those Violators," 3" and "Authority To Impose
Civil Penalties" 345 suggest the civil nature of the Act.
Like the Remedies Act, the civil penalty provisions of ITSA and
ITSFEA are separate and distinct from the criminal sanction provision of
the 1934 Act. 346 The separate designations for criminal and civil penalties
in the Acts demonstrates Congress' intent to keep each separate and
distinct from the other, and their intent for the ITSA and ITSFEA

m7 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a), (a)(1)(A),(B); Section 21A(a), (a)(1)(A) & (B) of the 1934 Act.
33
See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
39 See, Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401-02.
34 H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274. This reference is
part of the "Purpose and Summary" Section.
34 Id. at 9. This reference is part of the "Scope of Liability" Section.
30 Id. at 16. This reference is part of Section 2 of ITSA.
u3H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043. This reference is
part of the "Purpose and Summary" Section.
3" Id. at 16. This reference is part of the "Summary of Legislation" Section.
- Id. at 35. This reference is part of Section 3 of the Act.
3415 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994)
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penalties to be civil in nature. 347 Moreover, the fact that Congress chose
to place the civil monetary penalties of ITSA in Section 21 of the 1934
Act , 4 demonstrated an intent to create a civil provision, because Section
21 deals exclusively with the SEC's authority. 349 The SEC does not have
the authority to prosecute criminal cases. If Congress had intended to
create a criminal sanction in the ITSA, placing that sanction in Section 21
would have been inappropriate. 35° Further, creating a criminal remedy
would not accomplish Congress' goal of broadening the SEC's
enforcement powers.3 1 The legislative history of the ITSA also discusses
changes to criminal and civil sanctions separately. 3s2 Preponderance of
evidence standard and declines to mention any right to a jury trial. 353
The use of civil standard for the burden of proof, the lack of the right to a
jury trial, and the suggestion that the government may seek other
courses of action all demonstrate the civil nature of the penalty.3s4
Some parts of these Acts, however, suggest that these sanctions may
be criminal. The penalties under these Acts apply to a much more
narrow scope of conduct than does the criminal sanction. While Section
32 of the 1934 Act provides for criminal punishment for the violation of
all but one provision of the 1934 Act, the ITSA and ITSFEA penalties
apply only to a small subset of violations of a single provision of the Act,
Section 10(b). Perhaps Congress was dissatisfied with the possible
punishments one could receive for engaging in insider trading and
increased the penalty, making the provision appear penal in nature.
Additionally, one may be sanctioned as an aider and abettor as well as a
primary violator under ITSA, or as a controlling person, under ITSFEA,
which makes the statute appear more criminal than civil in nature.
35
Finally, one representative's reference to insider trading as "thievery" 5

347 See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 404; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 407 U.S. at 236-37; Ward, 448 U.S.

at 249.
-'5 15 U.S.C. § 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1994).
349 See Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A CriticalAssessment of the Insider Trading

Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 Duke L. J.960, 972 (1985). The same argument may be made for
the ITSFEA.
350 See Silver, supra note 349, at 972.
31 See id. at 972-73.
352 H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 12; H.R. REP. No. 100-910 at 23.
3 H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 15, 16 (1983).
- H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 15, 16 (1983). 15 U.S.C. §78u-1(d)(3) explicitly provides that the
actions authorized in the statute do not preclude any other actions, including, presumably,
criminal ones, that the government may have. See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401-02.
355Insider Trading Sanctions and SEC Enforcement Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1983)(statement of Rep. Wirth).
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and a senator's reference to insider traders as "thieves"% indicates intent
to punish criminally rather than civilly.3 7 While these facts cast some
doubt as to whether the Supreme Court would consider the penalties
under the ITSA and ITSFEA civil or criminal, they are not sufficient to
change Congress' explicitly stated intent to create civil penalties rather
than criminal ones.35 8
2.

ITSA and ITSFEA Sanctions Are Not So Punitive as to Override
Congress' Intent: Analysis of ITSA and ITSFEA Under the
Mendoza-Martinez Factors

Applying the Mendoza-Martinez analysis also reveals that these
sanctions are not so punitive in purpose or effect as to override
Congress' intent and convert them into criminal sanctions. First, the
monetary penalties imposed under the ITSA and ITSFEA do not
constitute affirmative disabilities or restraints. Second, the caselaw does
not historically regard these sanctions as punishment. Third, under
insider trading law, a finding of scienter is necessary to impose these
sanctions.35 9 Fourth, the sanctions definitely promote deterrence. 36
Fifth, the conduct for which the sanctions may be applied is also
criminal. 361 Sixth, the statutes serve remedial purposes. Seventh, the
penalties may or may not be excessive in relation to those remedial
purposes. A closer examination of the third through the seventh factors
reveals that although certain factors in the Mendoza-Martinez test weigh
toward finding a criminal sanction, these factors do not remove the
sanctions under the ITSA and ITSFEA from civil remedy status.
a)

The imposition of ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions require a
finding of scienter

Unlike other schemes the Court addressed in such cases as Ward and
Hudson, the violation under this statutory scheme requires scienter. 362
Because mens rea is most often required in criminal statutes, the existence
130 Cong. Rec. pt 15 (June 29,1984) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato).
See Silver, supra note 349, at 1004.
358 One commentator has argued that Congress did not actually decide to enact civil
remedies, rather they merely assumed that their remedies under the statutes were civil.
Silver, supra note 349, at 1013. Accordingly, Silver argues, we should not defer to Congress'
intent. Id.
3 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,425 U.S. 185 (1977).
-w See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274; H.R. REP. No. 100-910,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043.
36
3

"

31
36

15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1994).

2 See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185.
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of a scienter requirement for a person to be subject to an ITSA or ITSFEA
penalty tends to indicate a criminal nature. 363
b)

Insider trading may also be punished criminally

In addition to subjecting the violator to penalties under ITSA or
ITSFEA, insider trading may be punished criminally. Moreover, the
conduct punishable under ITSA and ITSFEA is coextensive with the
conduct punishable criminally under Section 32 of the 1934 Act. In other
words, if a person is sanctioned under ITSA or ITSFEA, she will also be
subject to a criminal prosecution under Section 32. Although this
scenario tends to indicate a violation of double jeopardy, Congress may
provide for both criminal and civil sanctions for the same conduct
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause per se.
c)

ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions serve deterrent and retributive
aims

The sanction of the ITSA and ITSFEA serve the punitive aim of
deterrence. 364 Like the legislative history of the Remedies Act, the
legislative history of ITSA and ITSFEA clearly indicates that the
legislation should have a deterrent effect. The House Report for ITSA
stated the legislation "provides increased sanctions against insider
trading in order to increase deterrence of violations." 36s The House
report also repeatedly refers to the inadequacy of the existing remedies
-to deter violations,366 and how the treble monetary penalty will facilitate
deterrence. 367 The House Report states, "existing remedies have proved
inadequate to deter violations."m The House report also states, "[T]he
Committee believes the new penalty provided by the legislation will
serve as a powerful deterrent to insider trading."3 9 It continues, "[Tihe
Committee believes that providing the [SEC] with the power to seek a
civil penalty for violations is the best way to accomplish the goal of
deterring insider trading." 370 The House Report for the ITSFEA states
that the Act would "augment enforcement of the securities laws,
363See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997)(citing Kennedy v.Mendoza-Martinez,

372 U.S. 144,168 (1963).
-16 See Michael J. Metzger, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their Relation to Substantive Law:
Ramifications of the Insider TradingSanctions Act of 1984,20 VAL U. L REV., 575,594 (1986).
30 H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 2 (1984).
-6Id. at 6, 7, 8,24.
w Id. at8, 13,24,25,26.
W Id. at 6.
m Id. at 8.
3 0Id. at 13.
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particularly in the area of insider trading, through a variety of measures
designed to provide greater deterrence, detection and punishment of
violations of insider trading." 3 1 Plus, in both the House and Senate
Reports, where they discuss increasing the criminal sanctions for
violating the 1934 Act, they state it is being done to preserve the
deterrent effect of the fine.372 Thus, the civil monetary penalties are
supposed to have the same effect as increased criminal sanctions:
deterrence. The intended identical effect makes civil penalties appear to
be criminal in nature. Precedent suggests, though, that deterrence has a
legitimate role to play in civil law and will not necessarily implicate a
double jeopardy claim.373 Additionally the fact that the sanction operates
374
to punish the violator does not alter the statute's civil character.
d)

ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions serve remedial ends

Even though the ITSA and ITSFEA exhibit some characteristics of a
criminal statute, the Acts have remedial features as well. The legislative
history demonstrates that Congress was acting with the remedial
purpose of safeguarding the public's expectation of fairness and honesty
in the market. The House report for ITSA states that,"[i]nsider trading
threatens [the] markets by undermining the public's expectations of
honest and fair securities markets where all participants play by the
same rules." 375 The ITSA was meant to "help to insure that insider
trading does not diminish public confidence in the fairness and integrity
of our securities markets," 376 and "reaffirm[s] that fairness and honesty
are the guiding principles of [the] securities markets." 377 Similarly, the
House Report for ITSFEA declares that the "[c]ommittee views [the
legislation] as an essential ingredient in a program to restore the
confidence of the public in the fairness and integrity of our securities
markets." 378 These are remedial purposes. In addition, a plethora of case
law indicates that the securities laws are remedial in nature.

- H.R. REP.
M H.R. REP.

No. 100-910, at 7, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043.
No. 98-355, at 12,22,26; H.R REP. No. 100-910, at 23.
373
See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149; Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496.
374Hess, 317 U.S. at 551. At least one commentator, however, argued that because the
sanctions' aims were deterrent and retributive, the sanctions should be found to be
criminal in nature. See, Blumberg, supra note 17, at 150-52.
375H.R. REP. No.98-355, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274.
376
H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 23 (1983).
377Id. at 25.

378 H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043.
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Because the United States Treasury collects the penalties, the
statutes again seem less remedial. 379 The statutes would seem more
remedial if the penalties were payable to a compensation fund for the
victims of the violator's fraud or even to a fund for SEC enforcement.=m
Several remarks made during the hearings for the Acts also suggest that
the penalties are not remedial:
John Fedders, former head of SEC enforcement,
described the treble penalty as 'an extraordinary
burden.' One participant stated that 'since the penalty
may exceed the inside trader's actual or theoretical gain
(or avoidance of loss), the penalty takes on significance
as a quasi-criminal punishment.'
Representative
Rinaldo asked whether 'a higher burden of proof, such
as proof by clear and convincing evidence, [should] be
applied in the special circumstances of treble damages
actions under [ITSA] in light of the potentially severe
penalties.'
Furthermore, in discussing whether a
definition of 'insider trading' should accompany ITSA,
Rinaldo stated that 'when you go from the remedial
stage to the punitive stage, . . . there should be a
definition, but that definition should apply only to...
the [treble penalty].'3 81
Paying the penalty to the treasury and the remarks of senators is not,
however, enough to prevent the statute from being characterized as
remedial in nature.m2
One commentator criticizes the remedial labeling of these penalties
because they do not indemnify the government. M This critic suggests
that these penalties are not like tax or contract action where the
government seeks indemnity.-8 4
With these SEC violations the
government suffers no loss as a result of the violator's actions. 38s These
37 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(d)(1) (1994).
3w See Metzger, supranote 364, at 607.
381Blumberg, supra note 17, at 151, 152 [footnotes omitted].
3v The severity of a penalty is of little relevence in determining whether it is civil or
criminal in nature. See Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400.
' See Blumberg, supranote 17, at 150.
3M

Id.

m See id. Blumberg also argues that, especially when compared to a truly remedial
sanction such as an injunction, a treble damages provision simply cannot be characterized
as remedial. Id. at .150-51. In light of Justice Black's discussion in Hess, 317 U.S. at 550 this
argument is simply not a valid one.
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arguments, however, fail to account for the government's investigative
and enforcement expenses. To the extent that the government incurs
costs in investigating and prosecuting a violation of the prohibition
against insider trading, the government is being indemnified by the
monetary penalty.38 6 The notion that a statute must serve the goal of
making the government whole in order to be remedial is incorrect. 387
e)

ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions are not likely to be found
excessive in relation to their remedial goals

In addition to disgorging the trader's profits and being barred from
serving as an officer or director in a publicly-held company, an inside
trader, or the controlling person, may be forced to pay a treble monetary
penalty. 8 Whether this penalty is excessive in relation to the remedial
goals announced in the legislative history is a difficult question to
answer.
In deciding to grant the SEC the authority to seek treble monetary
damages, Congress noted the opportunity presented by insider trading
to reap huge profits with little risk.389 Congress also noted the public
perception that the risk of detection was slight.39° This volatile
combination required a tough sanction to deter insider trading and
implement the remedial goal of insuring the integrity, honesty, and
fairness of the securities markets. In light of the number of insider
trading investigations conducted by the SEC,391 even the treble monetary
penalty sanction may not be tough enough. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has hypothesized that even a quadruple damages monetary
penalty regime might still fall within the civil realm. 392
On its face, however, a treble monetary penalty seems too excessive
to be characterized as remedial. Other treble monetary penalty
provisions provide a measuring stick to determine when treble damages
386See

One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237.

387 See 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 364; Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496.
W See supra notes 319-23 and accompanying text.
3N H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 6, 21, 23, reprinted in 1984
3 0 Id.
391According

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274.. See supra note 368.

to the Chairman of the SEC, more insider trading cases were filed by the SEC
in fiscal year 1997 than in any previous fiscal year, and a record number of insider trading
investigations are currently underway. Michael Schroeder, Nine Charged in a Trading Case
Tied to Merck's Purchaseof Medco, WALL ST. J., March 12, 1998, at B10.
3 See Hess, 317 U.S. at 551. Of course Hess dealt with a statute which authorized an action
by the government for injuries suffered by it due to the defendant's conduct. This is not
the use with insider trading.
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become excessive. Section 4A of the Clayton Act, 393 enacted in 1990,
authorizes the United States to sue in federal district court for treble
damages plus the cost of the suit when it has been injured by a violation
of the anti-trust laws. 394 No one has challenged this provision of the Act
on grounds of double jeopardy. A district court, however, employed a
Halper analysis and held that the civil recovery by a State of treble
damages plus costs, following a defendant's acquittal on criminal
Sherman Act charges, failed to constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. 395 Because the Halper approach has been discredited,
this case provides little guidance post-Hudson. Additionally, the
Supreme Court has held that the treble damages provision of the Clayton
Act for parties other than the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 15, is remedial in
396
nature.
The False Claims Act also provides for treble damages. 397 In 1986,398
Congress amended the Act to provide for a civil penalty of between
$5,000 and $10,000, plus treble damages, for any violation. Courts have
addressed whether sanctions imposed under the False Claims Act 399
constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes on several
occasions under the Halper analysis. A New York district court found
that a penalty of $115,000 failed to constitute punishment where the
government mounted costs in excess of $110,000. 4m A Texas district
court held that a penalty equal to 3.38401 times the government's
damages also failed to constitute punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 40 2 The Eighth Circuit held that the treble damages
provision of the False Claims Act was "in the nature of rough remedial
justice," not punishment. 40 3 Because the courts employed a Halper
analysis, the utility of their decisions is minimal.

m Section 5 of the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub.L.No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2879

(1990).
3 15 U.S.C. §15a (1994). Prior to this statute's enactment, the United States was only
authorized to seek actual damages plus the cost of the suit.
395
Connecticut v. Tobacco Valley Sanitation Co., 818 F. Supp. 504 (D.Conn. 1993). This action
was brought under the provision ofr parties other than the United States. 15 U.S.C. §15.
396Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
397 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
3" False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, §2, Pub.L.No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
3_ Pub.L.No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
"n United States v. Fliegler, 756 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. N.Y. 1990).
401Without factoring in the government's costs in prosecuting the case and in investigating
both the civil and the criminal case. Infra note 390, at 243. Had those costs been accounted
for, the court stated that the ratio would have been lower. Id.
4 United States v. Boutte, 907 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
4w United States v. Peters, 110 F.3d 616 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 162 (1997).
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A third statutory civil monetary penalty scheme that grants
potentially large penalties to the government is the Commodities
Exchange Act. As part of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974 (CFTCA),4 4 Congress provided for civil monetary penalties
in the amount of $100,000 per violation for commodities fraud or
manipulation. 4 5 The statute also authorized a trading bar and
suspension or revocation of registration. 4 6 In determining the amount of
the monetary penalty to be assessed, the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) needed to review a number of factors, including the
size of the violator's business and the violator's ability to pay. 4 7 As an
amendment to the CFTCA, the Futures Trading Practices Act (FTPA) of
1992,408 provided for a civil monetary penalty equal to the higher of
$100,000 or triple the monetary gain for each violation. The amended
statute also provided a restitution remedy to the victims of the fraud and
eliminated all considerations except the severity of the offense in
determining the amount of the monetary penalty. 409
Employing a Hudson analysis, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
double jeopardy claim concerning the CFTCA. 410 Grossfeld had been
assessed a $1.8 million monetary penalty for engaging in various
fraudulent activities and for violating a cease and desist order.411 When
Grossfeld claimed the penalty violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
court held that Congress intended the monetary sanction to be civil in
nature, because the statute was designated as a civil penalty, and
because an administrative agency imposed the penalty. 412 While
Grossfield's conduct could also be punished criminally, and the statute
promoted deterrence, the court responded that it did not impose an
affirmative restraint.413 The court further reasoned that monetary
404 Pub.L.No. 93-463,88 Stat. 1389 (1974).
7 U.S.C. § 9 (1994).
4
W Id.
-7 7 U.S.C. § 9a (1994).
4w Pub.L.No. 102-546,106 Stat. 3590 (1992).
W Id.

410Grossfeld v. CFTC, 137 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1998).
411Id. at 1302.
412Id. at 1303.
413 Id. at 1303-04. The CFTC had relied on United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding, employing a Halper analysis, that a trading bar and a $75,000 civil monetary
penalty was remedial when compared with government costs and did not constitute
punishment for double jeopardy purposes), as well as an earlier decision in the same case
(In the Matter of Kenneth Grossfeld & Murray L. Stein, 1993 WL 169894 (C.F.T.C.)
[Grossfeld I] (finding a $5,000 monetary penalty for violating the cease and desist order to
be remedial because, interestingly enough, its purpose was deterrence, and, utilizing a
Halper analysis, ruled that the penalty was remedial in nature). The CFTC's reasoning in

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol33/iss1/6

1998]

Sardegna: No Longer in Jeopardy: The Impact of Hudson v. United States on t

NO LONGER IN JEOPARDY

165

penalties had not historically been viewed as punishment, and the
penalty served the remedial goal of ensuring the integrity of the
commodities markets. 4 4 Finally, the Court held that the penalty was not
415
excessive in relation to that purpose.
The Seventh Circuit also employed a Hudson analysis and held that
a trading ban imposed under the CFTCA was not a criminal sanction. 416
In a subsequent case,417 the Seventh Circuit again employed a Hudson
418
analysis to hold that a post FTPA registration revocation was remedial.
No reported case, however, addresses the treble monetary penalty issue
41 9
under the FTPA amendment to the 1974 regime.
The Supreme Court has held a treble damages provision to be
remedial in the context of a private action for damages. 42° Thus, the
present Supreme Court may find that if treble damages are remedial and
Grossfeld I aside, there is authority for the position that contempt sanctions, which are
analogous to penalties for violating a cease and desist order, are remedial in nature. See In
the Matter of Kenneth Grossfeld & Murray L. Stein, 1996 WL 709219, *10, 11 (C.F.T.C.)
[Grossfeld II].
The CFTC also found that the NFA's sanction was not punishment for double jeopardy
purposes because the NFA was not a government agency. Id. Presumably, the same
would be true of the NASD or any of the other self regulatory organizations.
414 Id.
415Id.
416

LaCrossev. CFTC, 137 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 1998).
COX v. CFTC, 138 F.3d 268 (7th Cir. 1998).
418 The court relied upon LaCrosse and engaged in an identical Hudson/Ward analysis, with
one exception. The court noted that not all the violations for which the sanctions could be
imposed, under the new statute, required a finding of scienter. Cox, 138 F.3d at 272. Id.
Additionally, the court noted that CFTC Rule 3.60(e)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 3.60(e)(1), allowed the
violator to demonstrate that his continued registration would not pose a substantial risk to
the markets, thus rendering the sanction more remedial than punitive. Id. at 273. The court
again found that clear proof did not exist to override Congress' intent to create a civil
remedy. Id.
419In an unreported case, however, the Northern District of Illinois has ruled that a penalty
imposed under the 1992 version, authorizing treble penalties, was not criminal punishment
for double jeopardy purposes. United States v. Serfling, 1998 WL 142453 (N.D. Ill.). The
court employed a Ward/Hudson analysis and found that the penalty was intended to be civil
in nature and was not so punitive in form or effect as to negate that intent. 1998 WL
142453, *3-5. The penalty actually imposed in the case, though, was not a treble penalty. In
fact, the amount of the penalty was $250,000, when Serfling, a commodities broker, had
defrauded
his clients of over $425,000. Id. at *1.
420 Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1914)(holding that a statute of limitations
barring punitive actions did not apply to an action for treble damages under anti-trust
laws, because the anti-trust laws were remedial). This case was actually cited by the Court
in Hess in support of the dicta that the government could have provided for treble damages
under the False Claims Act instead of double damages, Hess, 317 U.S. at 550, which the
government eventually did, when it amended the Act in 1986. See notes 408-09 and
accompanying text. See also Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 477.
417
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not excessive when asserted by a private party, then they are remedial
and not excessive when asserted by the government. 421 Overall, little
case law exists on the issue of whether treble monetary penalties are
excessive to the remedial goal of safeguarding public confidence in the
integrity and fairness of the securities markets.
Congress has
determined that they were not excessive. In light of the Court's
repeatedly reiterated policy of deferring to congressional intent on
double jeopardy issues, the Court may once again defer to Congress and
find that a penalty is not excessive with relation to its remedial goals.
With regard to the excessiveness of the penalties, key distinctions
exist between ITSA, ITSFEA, and the Remedies Act. Unlike the
Remedies Act, the ITSA and ITSFEA do not have a tiered system limiting
the amount of the penalty dependent upon the seriousness of the
violation. The tiered system of the Remedies Act was an important
factor to the Second Circuit in determining that the sanctions imposed
under that statute were not excessive in relation to its remedial goals.42
While a first-tier penalty under the Remedies Act would not apply to
insider trading because of the scienter requirement, some insider trading
violations are undoubtedly more serious than others. The ITSA and
ITSFEA accommodate for varying degrees of seriousness by giving the
court discretion to grant or deny, and to set the amount of, the penalty.A3
In granting complete discretion to the trial judge, ITSA and ITSFEA are
similar to the Remedies Act. Thus, a court could likely find that the
treble monetary penalty is not excessive with relation to the remedial
purposes of ITSA and ITSFEA.
Looking at the seven factors of the Mendoza-Martinez test, a person
claiming that the imposition of a treble monetary penalty under the ITSA
or the ITSFEA was punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause would have three or four factors in their favor: the scienter
requirement, the deterrent and retributive purpose of the statutes, the
conduct for allowing imposition of the penalty also criminally
punishable, and, possibly, that the treble penalty is excessive with
relation to its remedial purposes. Of these factors, the courts have
consistently downgraded the importance of the deterrent purpose 424 and
the criminal punishment for the same conduct. 425 Whether the factors
421This is an adaptation of the Court's reasoning in Hess. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 550.
422See Palmisano, 135 F.3d at 866.
423See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (1994), Section 21A(a)(2) of the '34 Act; H.R. REP. No. 98-355,
at 8 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274.
424See, e.g., Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292; Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496.
425See, e.g., Ward, 448 U.S. at 250; 89 Firearms,465 U.S. at 365-66.
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that remain in the person's favor would be enough to convert the treble
monetary penalty into a criminal sanction depends on what the "clearest
proof" standard requires.
3.

The Clearest Proof Requirement: An Assessment

What the "clearest proof" standard requires is uncertain because it
426
has never been defined or met in the United States Supreme Court.
Moreover, it has been met only once at the United States Court of
Appeals and, as yet, remains undefined there as well. The Third Circuit
applied the Mendoza-Martinez test to a regulation issued by the Director
of the Selective Service System.427 The regulation reclassified anyone
who destroyed or abandoned their draft card as delinquent and ordered
them to report for immediate induction. Because surrendering a draft
card was already a crime, unable to find a remedial purpose, 428 the court
held that the regulation was criminal in nature. 429
As mentioned earlier, a person claiming a violation of double
jeopardy with regard to the ITSA or ITSFEA penalty would have three or
four factors in his or her favor. In Hudson, the person bringing the
double jeopardy claim had only the following two factors in his or her
favor: the conduct was also punishable criminally and the banking
statute that allowed imposition of the monetary penalty had the purpose
and effect of deterrence. The difference in the number of factors might
influence the outcome, but it is unlikely in light of the following cases.
Two other cases where at least three of the seven Mendoza-Martinez
factors were in the claimant's favor show no violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Sixth Circuit held that the reclassifying of one's
selective-service status to require immediate induction for destroying
Q6 Cheh, supra note 170, at 1358.
27
4 Bucher v. Selective Service System, Local Boards Nos. 2, 421 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1970).
m The government claimed that the regulation's remedial purpose was to prevent people
from evading military service. Id. at 32. The court rejected this argument on the ground
that the registrant at issue was exempt from service, as he was in category I-A. Id. In this
regard, the court misapplied the test in that it examined the facts of the case rather than
looking at the regulation on its face. See Mendoza-Martinez,372 U.S. at 169.
429
Bucher, 421 F.2d at 34. But see Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969), vacated
on other grounds, 397 U.S. 47 (1970). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit found that the civil
sanction imposed under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in Ward was criminal in
nature but was overruled by the Supreme Court. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th
Cir. 1979), overruled sub nom, United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 240 (1980). A district court
found an earlier version of the FWPCA to be criminal in nature as well. United States v.
LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558 (E. D.La. 1974). This earlier version, 33 U.S.C. §
1161(b)(5), had a scienter requirement in order for a civil penalty to be imposed, which was
deleted when the statute was recodified as 33 U.S.C. § 1321 in 1972.
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one's draft card was not a criminal sanction. 43° While the reclassification
for induction did impose an affirmative restraint, was imposed for
conduct which was already criminal, and did have elements of
deterrence and retribution, the court found that it was nevertheless
remedial in nature and not excessive with relation to those goals. 431 With
those factors in mind, the court determined that the plaintiff had not
shown the "clearest proof" required to overcome the government's
432
intention to create a civil or remedial sanction.
Returning to the realm of commodities regulation, the Seventh
Circuit held that a statutory provision authorizing a trading ban
imposed no affirmative disability or restraint and did not constitute
punishment. 433 The court further reasoned revocation of a privilege
voluntarily granted is not punishment. 434 The court recognized that a
finding of scienter was necessary to impose the sanction and that the
sanction promoted deterrence, but it found that the sanction served the
remedial goals of ensuring market integrity and protecting the public
interest. 435 The criminality of the conduct that allowed the imposition of
the sanction alone was not enough to change the character of the
remedy. 436 Finally, the court held that the trading ban had a remedial
purpose of protecting the public interest and was not excessive with
relation to that purpose. 437 Accordingly, the court found that the
defendant had not demonstrated the "clearest proof necessary" to alter
the character of the remedy to a criminal one when Congress explicitly
intended to create a civil remedy.43

430 Anderson v. Hershey, 410 F. 2d 492 (6th Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 397 U.S. 47
(1970).
431Id. at 498, 499.
432Id. at 499. But see Bucher v. Selective Service System, 421 F. 2d 24 (3d Cir. 1970).
433
LaCrosse v. Commodity FuturesTrading Comm'n , 137 F.3d 925 (7"' Cir. 1998).
434Id. at 931(citing Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496).
4 LaCrosse, 137 F.3d at 931-32.
436 Id. at 932.
437 Id.
438

LaCrosse v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 137 F.3d at 932. Two district courts also
ruled against claimants after finding three of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors in their
favor. Duncan v. Norton, 974 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Colo. 1997); United States v. Eureka
Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. W. Va. 1975). These cases are not of much persuasive
authority, however, as they misapplied the test when they stated that monetary penalties
imposed an affirmative disability or restraint, contrary to Supreme Court guidance. See,
e.g., Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (citing Hemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,617 (1960). The cases
ruling against claimants where the court found fewer than three factors in their favor are
legion. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518
U.S. 267 (1996); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Cole v. USDA, 133 F.3d 803
(11th Cir. 19 9 8)(statutory penalty imposing penalty equal to 75% of market value of tobacco
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Most notably the Supreme Court held that the Sexually Violent
Predator Act, which civilly confines persons who are likely to engage in
"predatory acts of sexual violence," because of a "mental abnormality"
or "personality disorder," was not a criminal sanction. 439 The Court held
that confinement, while being an obvious restraint, does not necessarily
equal punishment and a criminal sanction. 440 In the context of violations
of prison rules, the Eleventh Circuit found administrative punishment to
be civil in nature despite the fact that five of the seven Martinez-Mendoza

factors were in the claimants' favor. 441 The Court conceded the first five
factors and relied solely on the sanctions' remedial purposes and found
them to be excessive with relation to those purposes. 442 With holding
such as these, one wonders if any nominally civil sanction could ever be
found criminal in nature. Accordingly, a person claiming that ITSA or
ITSFEA imposes criminal sanctions, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, will not likely to be able to meet the "clearest proof" standard.

marketed in excess of set quota not a criminal penalty); Roach v. NTSB, 804 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988)(suspension of pilot's license for 60 days was not
punitive); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975)($600 penalty imposed
for "serious" OSHA safety violations not criminal in nature); Frank Irey, Jr. v. OSHRC, 519
F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975)($5,000 penalty imposed for willful OSHA safety violations were
not punitive or criminal in nature; Williams v. Leybold Techs., 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal.
1992)($10,000 penalty per day for noncompliance with reporting requirements of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act civil, not criminal in nature);
United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 642 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1986)($25,000
penalty per day for noncompliance with request for information by EPA under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act not criminal in nature; United States v. General
Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975)($1,200 penalty imposed for violation of
FWPCA not a criminal penalty); United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 354 F. Supp. 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1973)($1 million in penalties assessed by Federal Trade Commission under
statute authorizing $5,000 per violation of a cease and desist order was civil in nature);
United States v. Dunkel, 1998 WL 83086 (N.D. Ill. 1998)(interest and penalties for
deficiencies in tax paid are not criminal in nature); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, (E.D.
Mich. 1998)(Michigan's version of "Megan's Law," whereby sex offenders must register
with the police, and neighbors are informed of the offender's presence, is not criminal in
nature); Towers v. City of Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ill. 1997)(vehide forfeitures for
nuisance violations civil in nature); O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 817 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.
Pa. 1993), vacated on other other grounds,32 F.3d 785 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1014
(1995) (penalties for parking violations civil in nature); Unites States v. Lippert, 14 F.3d 974
(2d Cir. 1998) (The Anti-kickback Statute, 41 U.S.C. §54, authorizing a penalty of "not more
than $10,000 for each occurrence" is civil in nature).
4" Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
"0 Id. at 2083.

"1 United States v. Mayes 1998 U.S. App Lexis 27939 (October 29,1998).
at *22-31.

" 2Id.
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B.

Problems with Finding the ITSA and ITSFEA Sanctions Civil in Nature

If a court held that ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions are civil in nature, it
would be technically correct, but this outcome can also cause problems.
For example, a doctor, unsophisticated and inexperienced in financial
matters, joins a publicly-traded biomedical company to do research and
signs a confidentiality agreement. During the course of his employment,
the doctor discovers facts that would adversely affect the price of the
stock if they were made public. Not owning any stock in the company
himself and not realizing the importance of the information, but
knowing that several of his wife's friends do own stock in the company,
the doctor casually mentions to his wife what he discovered. The
doctor's wife then repeats the information to her friends, who sell their
stock in the company immediately. The wife's friends tell everyone they
know to sell their stock as well. When the information subsequently
becomes public, the price of the stock drops 30%. Assume that the price
of the stock was $50 per share prior to the drop, and that the doctor's
wife's friends and the people they told to sell owned an aggregate total
of 200,000 shares.
Under current insider trading laws, both the doctor and his wife can
be labeled tippers, in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule
10b-5. Under Section 32 of the 1934 Act, the doctor and his wife could
each be criminally punished for their actions by up to $1,000,000 in fines
plus ten years in prison. In addition they could both be forced to pay
civil monetary penalties of $9,000,000 under the ITSA. 443 The biomedical
company could be penalized under the ITSFEA in an amount up to triple
4
the losses avoided by the persons that the doctor's wife told directly. "
All these penalties potentially could apply when neither the doctor nor
his wife profited at all from their actions. 445
Under the Ward/Hudson analysis, the doctor's claim that the civil
monetary penalty constitutes a second criminal sanction in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause would likely fail. The SEC would be free to
proceed against him following his criminal conviction. Alternatively, the
United States Attorney could prosecute following the SEC enforcement
43 This amount is computed by tripling the loss avoided ($15/share) multiplied by the

aggregate number of shares traded (200,000).
44 This assumes that the company qualifies as a controlling person and either had reason to
know that the doctor would engage in insider trading and did nothing to stop it or had no
regulations in place to prevent such conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b) (1994). The limitation of
the controlling person's liability to responsibility only for the first level of persons who
trade is set by 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(3) (1994).
44 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 US 646 (1983); SEC v. Wade, 151 F 3d 42 (1998).
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action. The facts and result presented in the hypothetical are patently
unjust. Additionally, it is at lease troubling to characterize a statute as
civil when it sanctions conduct narrower in scope than the relevant
criminal provision, provides for the sanctioning of an aider and abettor,
has a scienter requirement for the imposition of its penalties, has the
purpose of deterrence and retribution, and prohibits conduct referred to
by Congress as "thievery." 446 Thus, even the Ward/Hudson analysis could
yield unjust results when dealing with the ITSA and ITFSEA.
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES To DETERMINE THE VALIDIDTY OF CIVIL
MONETARY PENALTIES

While the Ward/Hudson approach is more appropriate than the
Halper analysis, the Ward/Hudson approach nevertheless has its
shortcomings with regard to the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, it is
doubtful whether the Court will ever employ the test seriously. 447 Using
the Ward analysis, 44 8 the Supreme Court, has even held civil confinement
statutes for those likely to commit sexual crimes to be civil in nature. 449
These decisions make clear that the Court will determine any
congressional attempt to control anti-social behavior through monetary
penalties to be a civil proceeding, regardless of the penalties' severity,
unless Congress either designates the proceeding criminal or provides
for the procedures or safeguards of a criminal proceedings. 450 The
danger is that such conclusive deference to congressional labeling could
easily lead to legislative abuses. 451 Under the Ward Analysis, Courts
have abdicated their job of deciding whether statutes violate the
Constitution,452 deferring too much to congressional intent by
concentrating on the purpose of a statutory penalty instead of its
effects. 453 Because the Ward/Hudson approach only concentrates on the
446

See notes 348-50 and accompanying text.

447 See Cheh, supra note 170, at 1358.
4

" Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2072; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).

449 See Cheh, supra note 170, at 1362-63.

4% See id. at 1364. See also, Cooper, supra note 4, 1- 2 ("If the legislature denominated the
sanction 'civil,' then it will be virtually impossible to find that it did not intend it to be
treated as civil rather than criminal."); Martin, supra note 174, at 666 (Congress' statutory
labeling of a ... proceeding as 'civil' [is] practically unassailable).
451See id. at 1354.
452See Eads, supra note 36, at 966-67.
453 See id. One commentator has advocated simply assessing the sanction's severity.
Blumberg, supra note 17, at 156. If the sanction is sufficiently severe, Blumberg argues, it
will be considered criminal punishment. Id. Under such an analysis, Blumberg asserts that
the ITSA sanctions are criminal. This approach, however, directly contradicts longstanding Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, Blumberg offers no guideposts for
determining when a sanction becomes too severe to be characterized as civil.
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statutory provision on its face, it fails to account for the rare case when
the rubric of the statute creates a patent injustice.
A. Modification of the Ward/Hudson Analysis
The framework of the Ward/Hudson analysis offers two possible
solutions to the injustice it could cause. The first alternative is to modify
the "clearest proof" standard in favor of some lesser burden. While the
"clearest proof" standard should not be watered town to create an easy
way to overturn the expressed intent of Congress, the "clearest proof"
standard should also not operate as a guarantee that a finding in favor of
a party seeking to overturn Congress "is likely to be as rare in the future
as it has been in the past." 4 4 Accordingly, courts could be less
deferential to Congress' intent and give more weight to the
countervailing indications of criminal nature.
Alternatively, as Justice Breyer suggests, the "clearest proof"
standard could be relegated to "the same legal limbo where Halper now
rests."4 5 Instead of applying the heavy standard, courts could merely
apply the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors and decide whether the
measure is criminal in nature based upon an even-handed analysis of
those factors. Such a change would not have made a difference in the
outcome of Hudson or Palmisano,but it might result in a finding that the
ITSA and ITSFEA sanctions are criminal in nature. At a minimum,
double jeopardy protection against multiple criminal punishments
masquerading in the form of civil penalties would exist in actuality
instead of in name only. The "clearest proof" standard offers this "name
only" protection.
The second possibility is to eliminate the requirement that the
Mendoza-Martinez factors be employed with regard to the statute on its
face rather than assessing the character of the sanctions actually
imposed. 456 Justice Breyer suggested this avenue in Hudson, recognizing
that looking only at the statute on its face fails to address injustices that
occurred in a situation like Halper.457 Justice Breyer noted that a statute
that provides for a punishment that normally is civil in nature could

454118 S.Ct. at 501 (Souter, J., concurring).
455 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
456 Id. at 501-02.
7
45 Id. at 502.
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nonetheless amount to a criminal punishment as applied in special
circumstances. 4 "
The Sixth Circuit utilized this synthesis of the Ward and Halper
analyses in an attempt to reconcile the two cases. 45 The court employed
the first prong of the Ward test and found that Congress intended the
penalties assessed under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act 460 to be
civil in nature. 461 The court then applied the seven Mendoza-Martinez
factors and determined that the sanctions were civil in nature. 462 When
the court considered the seventh factor, whether the sanction was
excessive with relation to its remedial purpose, it viewed the amount of
the sanction actually imposed. Because the sanction only made the
government whole, the court did not find it excessive. 463
While the Sixth Circuit focused on making the government whole,
two other decisions utilized a similar approach where the sanction
imposed did not compensate the government for damages. The Third
Circuit needed to decide whether the sanction imposed, immediate
induction, was excessive with relation to its remedial purpose.4" The
court looked more to the facts of the case than the statute on its face.
Finding that the person sanctioned was ineligible for military service, the
Court held that, on those facts, the sanction was excessive with relation
to its remedial purposes, constituting criminal punishment. 465 A West
Virginia district court addressed whether a sanction under the FWPCA
was civil or criminal. 466 The court considered the amounts of the
sanctions actually imposed.
The assessed penalty was $521 per
violation, instead of the $5,000 statutory maximum, and therefore not
excessive under the seventh Mendoza-Martinez factor. 467
45 Id.

459 United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1993)
4- 30 U.S.C. § 820(a) (1994).
461 United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d at 141.
4
6Id. at 141-42.
463 Id. at 142. See also, United States v. J & T Coal, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 925, 927-29 (W. D. Va.
1993). Why the court looked at the sanction actually imposed and the facts and
circumstances of the case when the pre-Halper caselaw at the time called for merely
examining the provision on its face is unclear.
4" Bucher v. Selective Service System, 421 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1970).
46 Id. at 32. This case was the only occasion where a circuit court held an ostensibly civil
sanction to be criminal in nature. Again, why court looked at the sanction actually
imposed and the facts and circumstances of the case when the pre-Halpercaselaw called for
merely examining the provision on its face is unclear.
'"United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. W. Va. 1975).
Id. at 940-41. Again, why the court did so, in light of the precedent to the contrary, is
unclear.
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This approach has an advantage over a facial examination of the
statute, because it can accommodate the possibility of injustice that could
easily occur under the ITSA and ITSFEA. Unfortunately, such an
approach would result in an analysis of whether each sanction imposed
is civil or criminal for double jeopardy purposes on a case-by-case basis.
This approach would also inevitably result in a double jeopardy claim in
nearly every case involving both civil monetary penalties and a criminal
prosecution, thus slowing down the judicial process. Such an approach
injects a degree of uncertainty in the law because, even though a
statutory provision could be a civil one, a penalty imposed under it in
any given case could be found to be criminal. 46
B.

Possible ConstitutionalArguments Other than Double Jeopardy: Excessive
Fines and Substantive Due Process

Additionally, in Hudson, the Court proposed two other alternatives
to the Double Jeopardy Clause, namely the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause or the Due Process Clause. 469 Analyses of the
Excessive Fines and Due Process Clause jurisprudence reveal that the
availability of relief to a defendant/respondent under either of those
clauses is uncertain.
1.

The Excessive Fines Clause

The Eighth Amendment is perhaps the more appropriate vehicle for
correcting constitutional violations of civil monetary penalties that are
too severe. 470 It is more suited to a case-by-case analysis than is the
Double Jeopardy Clause. An Excessive Fines Clause analysis could
address the concerns raised by civil monetary penalties without
triggering the problems created by the Halper analysis.471 While a
number of commentators have also suggested the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause as an alternative to claiming a double jeopardy
violation,472 any claim made by a person subjected to civil monetary
penalties is likely to fail.

468 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
469 Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495 (1997). The Chief Justice also suggests the equal protection
clause as a possible alternative (presumably only in cases where a State imposes the
sanctions as opposed to the federal government). However, the applicability of that clause
remains uncertain.
470 See Henning, supra note 167, at 6.
471See id. at 56.
47 See, e.g., Eads, supra note 36, at 992; Jahncke, supra note 18, at 114-15; Henning, supra note
167, at 6; Cox, supra note 12, at 1269; King, supra note 182, at 146.
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As long ago as 1833, the Supreme Court held the Excessive Fines
Clause applied only to criminal cases. 4' 3 More recently, the Supreme
Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause was not applicable to a
private civil punitive damages award. 474 According to the Court, the
term "fine" was understood at the time of the adoption of the Eighth
Amendment to mean "a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense." 475 The Court further noted that, fines were assessed in
criminal, rather than in private civil, actions.476
In 1993, the Court abandoned the traditional civil/criminal
distinction and instead followed Halper, examining whether or not the
provision at issue constituted punishment.4 7 With Halper having been
discredited, however, the Court is likely to resurrect the civil/criminal
distinction in Excessive Fines jurisprudence. The analysis, then, would
once again become whether a particular statute imposes a criminal
sanction or a civil one. In making this determination, the Court would
probably follow precedent and employ the Ward test. If the Supreme
Court decided differently, it would create the anomalous situation of a
sanction constituting punishment for Excessive Fines Clause purposes,
but not for double jeopardy purposes. 8 Accordingly, the Excessive
47 Ex ParteWatkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 786, 789 (1833).
474Browning-FerrisIndustries v. Kelco Disposal,492 U.S. at 257.
475 Id. at 265.
476 Id.
07 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 602. See, e.g., Dallet, supra note 13 at 240-48; Martin, supra note 165,
at 663-64, 672-73.
47 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 602 (holding that civil forfeitures are punishment and, therefore,
are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause); Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2135 (holding that civil
forfeitures are not punishment for double jeopardy purposes). Accordingly, the dicta in
Hudson stating that "[t]he Eighth Amendment protects against excessive civil fines . . ."
Hudson , 118 S. Ct. at 495 (citing Alexander, 509 US at 544), is not likely to be of much
assistance to future litigants.
The recent Supreme Court case of Bajakajianv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998), did
not alter this analysis. In Bajakajian, the Court found an in personam criminal forfeiture
imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) to be violative of the Excessive Fines Clause. The
Court distinguished this provision from an in rem civil forfeiture provision. Id. The Court,
thus, did not have to address the issue of whether a nominally civil forfeiture was
tantamount to criminal punishment for Excessive Fines Clause purposes. Since the
securities fraud penalties under ITSA, ITSFEA, and the Remedies Act are civil in nature,
the issue remains whether or not they would be treated as such. From the Court's opinion,
one can surmise, as the dissent does, that the forfeiture would have been upheld had it
been sought in a civil as opposed to a criminal forfeiture proceeding. Id. at 2041,2047.
In Bajakajian, the Court also adopted a proportionality test from the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and applied it to the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 2029, 203336. Even if the monetary penalties under the securities laws were found to be punishment
within the Eighth Amendment, a proportionality review could well be of no avail to a
defendant because there is ample precedent for treble damages provisions, i.e., treble
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Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment is not likely to assist a person
who could not make a case for a violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
2.

The Due Process Clause

The Due Process Clause is more promising for the defendant. The
imposition of a penalty without a rational relation to the defendant's
culpability violates due process. 47 Because the sanctions imposed under
the ITSA and ITSFEA are discretionary, a possible violation of due
process is more likely than if the statutes had mandatory amounts.480
Demonstrating that a penalty bears no rational relation to the nature of
the offense or the claimant's culpability, however, could be difficult.
Historically, courts have been hostile to these types of claims. For
example, a North Carolina district court found that the imposition of
$577.84 and $2,000 penalties for failures to itemize a fee for $4.00 and
$17.75 bordered on the unconscionable but was insufficient to invoke
substantive due process. 481 Additionally, the Halper analysis utilized the
same standard as does substantive due process, and during the Halper
era the claimants still had difficulty meeting this standard. 482 Moreover,
monetary penalties could very well be constitutional anyway. See Calvin R. Massey, The
Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1233, 1273 (1987).
479 See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454
(1993)(citing St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v.
Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912); 78 (Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86,
111 (1909)); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907). See also, e.g., TXO
Production Corp., 509 U.S. at 458 (a general concern of reasonableness properly enters into
the constitutional calculus)(citing Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18
(1991)).
4n See Reese v. Railroard Retirement Board, 906 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1990)(holding, inter alia,
that penalties imposed for failure to report the receipt of excess retirement benefits was not
a violation of due process because the amount of the penalties imposed under the Railroard
Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. § 231 et. seq., were mandatory under the statute).
481Dalton v. Bob Neill Pontiac,476 F. Supp. 789, 797 n.13 (M.D. N.C. 1979). See also, WatersPierce Oil Co., 212 U.S. at 96 (holding that penalties of $1,500/day for violating Texas antitrust laws did not violate due process); St. Louis, L M. & S. Ry. Co., 251 U.S. at 63 (holding
that a penalty of up to $300 for each instance of overcharging a customer did not violate
due process). But see Danaher, 238 U.S. at 482 (holding that penalties of $100/day,
aggregating $6,300, for overcharging a customer 50 cents/month was so arbitrary and
oppressive as to violate due process).
412 See supra Section IV. The author is aware of only two reported cases (aside from the
Halpercase itself) where a statutory penalty was struck down under the Halper analysis. A
number of lower courts had done so, but they were overruled, vacated, or modified by the
Supreme Court. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 767 (where the Bankruptcy and District Courts
struck down the tax using a Halper analysis, but the Supreme Court disavowed the use of
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feelings regarding the availability of this alternative are not uniform.
Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that the Due Process Clause
contains absolutely no limit on penalties at aU.
la 4 It has also been held
that, for due process purposes, no inherent unfairness exists in parallel
civil and criminal proceedings. 4 It is worth noting that the facts of the
cases with this holding dealt with parallel Department of Justice and SEC
investigations. Apparently, then, the only grounds for a due process
claim will be the severity of the sanction itself. All in all, the parameters
of this possible protection seem murky at best.48s
VII. CONCLUSION
Under the analysis employed in Halper, the SEC was quite correct to
be leery of seeking criminal monetary penalties in cases where a criminal
prosecution had occurred or was likely to occur. Had it done so, it could
have faced a ruling by a court that the penalty constituted punishment
and precluded a subsequent criminal prosecution. 486 Hudson all but
eliminated that concern. The Seventh Circuit offered a prime example of
the difference between the two analyses when it examined the validity of
an OSHA penalty imposed under the Occupational Health and Safety
Act. 48 S.A. Healy was convicted and civilly sanctioned for the same

the Halper analysis in deciding tax cases); Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149 (where the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the forfeiture at issue was invalid under
Halper); 118 S. Ct. at 623 (where the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's
invalidation of a sanction imposed by OSHA under 29 U.S.C. § 666(a), utilizing a Halper
analysis, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Hudson); Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2073
(where the Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's determination that the
Sexually Violent Predator Act violated substantive due process). Austin, it will be recalled,
did not invalidate any sanction imposed, but rather it merely held that the Excessive Fines
Clause was applicable and remanded for a determination of excessiveness.
4 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,275- 276 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
4", United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
See King, supra note 182, at 112-13.
486See Eads, supra note 36, at 963-64 (stating, "[i]f the Commission seeks [treble monetary
penalties] after a successful prosecution, a defendant will rely on Halper,arguing: (1) that a
treble monetary penalty bears no rational relationship to the government's compensation
for its loss in this particular case and (2) that the trial court, under the holding of Halper,is
not free to consider any government costs that do not apply to this particular defendant...
[D]epending on the quickness, ease of the government's investigation, and other criteria
that are case-specific, this argument may prevail ....
An appellate court could find [an
award of treble monetary penalties] to be an abuse of discretion under the guidelines of
Halper ... [Eispecially if the defendant has already disgorged profits and has been
punished criminally."). Similarly, a prior criminal prosecution could have precluded the
seeking of civil monetary penalties in an SEC civil or administrative action. See Labby &
Callcott, supra note 212, at 35 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 19).
-829 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. The civil monetary penalty was imposed under Section 666(a).
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violations and claimed a double jeopardy violation. 488 The court
examined the sanction imposed, using a Halper analysis. The statute
required that the court consider the size of the employer, the gravity of
the violation, the good faith of the employers, and the prior history of the
employer in determining the penalty amount.489 Moreover, the court
noted that the penalty per violation was higher than that authorized in
the False Claims Act, that the United States was not a victim, and that the
secretary of Labor had issued a directive which stated that the purpose
of the civil penalties was deterrence. 49° Because the government was not
a victim, the statute prohibited considering whether the government was
made whole by the sanction, and because the purpose of the statute was
deterrence, the court concluded the sanction imposed was not remedial
and constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 491 Following
the government's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the
Seventh Circuit's decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Hudson, which the Supreme Court had decided in the interim. 492 On
remand, the Seventh Circuit applied the Ward/Hudson analysis and
concluded that the sanctions did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 493 The statute at issue was explicitly labeled a "civil penalty." 494
The court then looked to earlier cases, which had employed the MendozaMartinez and found that the statute was civil.495 Accordingly, the court
rejected Healy's claim. 496
While the return to traditional double jeopardy analysis, which
Hudson represents, has eased government enforcement efforts, that
return comes at a possibly unfair price. At present, violations of statutes
commonly expose wrongdoers to a range of sanctions in addition to
criminal punishment. 497 The distinction between criminal and civil law

S.A. Healy Co., 96 F. 3d at 907-08.
49Id. at909.
490 Id. at
491

909-911.

Id.

49 S.A. Healy Co. v. OSHRC, 118 S. Ct. 623,139 (1997).
49 S.A. Healy Co.,138 F.3d. at 687.
494Id.
49 Id. Those cases included Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975) and
Frankfrey Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974). See supra note 450.
4- S.A. Healy Co., 138 F.3d. at 687.

49 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 3. The importance of this issue is clear and will likely
continue to grow in importance. Already, parallel civil and criminal actions are becoming
more the rule than the exception in prosecutions for economic crimes. Henning, supranote
171, at 4. In Atlas Roofing Co., 518 F.2d at 990, the court compiled a list of statutory
provisions authorizing the imposition of civil monetary penalties. That list covered six
pages in the Federal Reporter. Id. at 1003-09. In 1975, when Atlas Roofing was decided, the
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is collapsing. 498 Civil remedies supplement criminal sanctions. 499 While
this practice does not always constitute a technical violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, it negates one of the main purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause: to prevent the government from seeking
additional punishment when it is dissatisfied with the results of a
criminal proceeding.
Moreover, the practice of pursuing parallel civil and criminal actions
can frequently operate to prejudice the subject of those actions. 5°° For
example, in order to defend against potentially huge civil monetary
penalties in an SEC insider trading enforcement action, a respondent
may be forced to relinquish his privilege against self-incrimination, to his
detriment in the criminal proceeding.50'
On the other hand, if a
respondent remains silent to preserve his privilege in the criminal action,
he has impaired his ability to defend the civil action because the civil
tribunal may draw an adverse inference from his silence. 502 At the same
time, the government can also use the generous discovery opportunities
in the civil proceeding to obtain information for the criminal prosecution
that would otherwise not be available.503
The widespread practice by Congress of granting these additional
civil remedies is understandable. Civil remedies are easier to use, more
efficient, and less costly than criminal prosecutions.5 4 The likelihood
that offenders will be punished is greater. 5°s Additionally, the case law
seems to indicate that most, if not all, statutory civil monetary penalties
court noted nearly 100 such statutory provisions in the U.S. Code. Id. That number has

grown substantially since that time, and it is likely to continue to grow.
Cheh, supra note 170, at 1325.

498See

499Id.

5w Id. at 1331.
so1Id.
5w Id. at 1390.
5w Cheh, supra note

170, at 1325. In this regard, the government is assisted tremendously
by the courts. The government is far more likely to be able to secure a stay of civil
proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal prosecution than is the defendant. A
defendant's motion to stay the civil proceedings will fail if the government can show a
legitimate reason for bringing the civil case. As long as the government is not found to be
acting in bad faith, a court is unlikely to grant a defense requested stay. To demonstrate
bad faith, a defendant usually must prove that the government purposely brought the civil
case to bypass the more limited criminal discovery rules. The government, on the other
hand, is much more successful because it claims that a defendant's civil discovery might
jeopardize ongoing criminal investigations or prosecutions. Courts are also amenable to
the government argument that the defendant is seeking to circumvent criminal discovery
rules by availing himself of the more liberal civil discovery procedures. Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1345.
50 See id.
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are not violative of the Double Jeopardy, Excessive Fines Clause, or the
Due Process Clause.
The SEC's ability to seek and obtain civil monetary penalties is "no
longer in jeopardy." Violators of the securities laws can no longer make
meritorious claims that those penalties violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Moreover, any possibility of relief from reliance on some other
constitutional provision is uncertain at best. For better or worse, in
Hudson, the Supreme Court placed the fates of alleged wrongdoers
squarely in the hands of Congress.
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